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Abstract : This paper focuses on the properties of the matching process which leads to scientific 
collaboration. In a first step, it proposes a simple theoretical model to describe the intertemporal 
choice of researchers facing successive opportunities of co-authoring papers. In a second part, the 
paper empirically assesses the properties of the model. The main empirical result is that the number 
and the productivity of a researcher's co-authors reflect the productivity of this researcher. This result 
is consistent with the assumption that co-authorship is motivated by a willingness to increase both the 
quality and the quantity of research output. As researchers with a lot of influent publications papers 
may create links with a large number of influential co-authors, co-authoring with highly productive 
academics appears as a signaling device of researchers’ quality. 
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Introduction: 
 
In its traditional approach, sociology of science considers research as a solitary activity. Science 
progresses as a winner takes all race and all the prestige of a breakthrough is granted to the first author 
who publishes a new result. Co-authorship which limits the prestige of being at the origin of a new 
concept seems thus unnatural (Stephan 1996). Moreover, co-authorship requires coordination efforts, 
imposes compromises between authors or may limit the innovative content of the collective work as 
authors may have different degree of risk aversion (Hudson 1996). Co-authorship may also suffer 
from free riding, the workload may be unfairly distributed and it is difficult ex ante to identify the true 
ability of a potential coauthor (Hollis 2001, Fafchamps et al. 2010). Last but not least, the fact that an 
author writes only co-authored papers is usually seen by his peers as a hint of his/her inability to write 
a paper alone and is therefore considered as a negative signal of scientific proficiency.  
Given the problems raised by scientific collaborations it may seem difficult to understand the 
monotonic long run increase in co-authorship. 
Since the end of the seventies, a vast strand of research emphasizes that coauthoring papers is not the 
exception but constitutes a new scientific norm (see for instance Beaver and Rosen 1978; Stefaniak 
1982; Petry 1988; Zitt et al. 2000, Laband and Tollison 2000, Cardoso et al 2010, Card and 
DellaVigna 2013, Hamermesh 2013 and 2015)
1
. Generally, the economic literature explains this 
evolution through the positive effects of scientific collaboration on the quantity and the quality of the 
research output. Even if empirical evidence is sometimes contradictory, several hints seem to connect 
co-authorship and improved papers’ quality. For instance, Laband (1987) or Johnson (1997) report 
that citations frequency is significantly higher for co-authored papers compared to single-authored 
ones. Laband and Tolisson (2000) and Ursprung and Zimmer (2007) document that co-authorship 
increases acceptance rate by refereed journals. Chung et al. (2009) shows that papers co-authored with 
a prolific author receive more citations and thus seem to be of a better quality. Co-authoring is also 
considered as a way to increase the number of papers that a researcher may publish during a given 
period of time. Durden and Perry (1995) finds that the total number of publications is significantly and 
positively related to the number of collaborative publications. Hollis (2001) shows that the more co-
autorship done in the past, the more prolific an author is likely to be today. Lee and Bozeman (2005) 
stresses that collaboration is a strong predictor of the total number of a researcher’s publications.2 
As co-authorship is likely to play a central role in the production of knowledge, it is important to 
understand the factors that favor or hinder collaboration. However, if the motivations of team 
formation in scientific activities, and more specifically in the writing of papers, are now well identified 
(see Bruno 2014 for a recent survey), little has been done yet to understand the specific characteristics 
which lead researchers to choose each other in the building of a new team. 
                                                          
1
 See also Wuchty et al 2007 for a description of the way how in sociology of science, focus shifted 
from individual researcher to teamwork. 
2
Note that the available empirical evidence on the benefits of co-authorship on individual research productivity 
is mixed. The results put forward by Lee and Bozeman (2005) or Hollis (2001) disappear once the scientific 
production is weighted by the number of co-authors. Chung et al. (2009) doesn’t disclose any effect of co-
authorship on quality when papers are written with colleagues at the same institution (see Bidault and 
Hilldebrand 2014 for an extensive review). 
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If we exclude the specific cases where collaboration is justified by friendship or is considered as a way 
to escape academic isolation (Medoff, 2003, Acedo et al., 2006, Hamermesh, 2013), team formation is 
mainly explained by advocating the role of complementarities in researchers’ abilities. In a pioneer 
paper, McDowell and Melvin (1983) linked the raise of co-authorship to the explosion of knowledge 
in economics. In an academic world where researchers are involved in increasing specialization, co-
authorship allows complementarities and appears as an efficient way to improve scientific production. 
Under alternative presentations, this seminal argument has been developed in a series of contributions. 
For instance, Piette and Ross (1992) states that authors who work in areas outside of their specialty 
tend to engage more in co-authorship than authors with close scientific tools. More recently, focusing 
on Nobel Laureates’ pattern of co-authorship, Chan et al. (2015), shows that scientific collaboration 
may be induced by conceptual complementarities – complementarities that erode through time after 
repeated interaction. 
 
Another line of research considers the gender dimension of team formation. Boschini (2007) puts 
forward evidences of gender sorting in team formation. She underlines that the propensity to co-author 
with a woman is higher for women than for men. Moreover, this propensity gap increases with the 
presence of women in the field of research. This result is consistent with experimental evidence that 
the gender composition of teams affects team productivity (Ivanova-Stenzel and Kubler 2011). The 
fact that women seem to perform worse in case of gender mixed teams added to the under 
representation of women in research activities may contribute to explain a lower rate of co-authorship 
in the researchers’ female population. 
More anecdotal factors may also influence team formation. For instance Ong et al (2015) shows that 
co-authorship may be affected by the order in which authors are listed on title pages. The authors show 
that, as authors with earlier last names initials have better visibility, they are therefore more keen to 
start collaborations.  
In these settings, our work aims at following an intuition by Fafchamps et al. (2010) who underlines 
the matching problem of finding a co-author (see also Hamermesh 2015). When research output 
depends on ability, they state that collaboration is most likely between authors of a similar level of 
ability (what they call assortative matching). Collaboration between authors with different abilities can 
only arise if the contribution of the low skilled author relaxes the time-constraint of his/her co-authors. 
In this agreement, high skilled authors produce more research while low skilled researchers increase 
the mean quality of their output. 
   In order to examine the consequences of this intuition, our paper presents first a simple theoretical 
model in which authors with different level of ability are randomly matched. Each researcher has to 
decide if he/she accepts to collaborate or if he/she prefers to work alone. By assumption, collaboration 
allows saving time on a paper but, according to the characteristics of both researchers or on the 
assessment rules, the co-authored scientific production may present a lower value than a singled 
authored paper. Built in a dynamic setting, the model leads to the characterization of an optimal 
decision rule leading to the choice of collaboration. In a nutshell, three main conclusions arise from 
the model: first, the higher the ability of a researcher, the higher will be the skills of his/her co-authors. 
Second, the number of papers written during a given period of time is increasing with the productivity 
of the researcher. Finally, a talented author should more frequently meet authors willing to accept 
collaboration and should have more co-authored papers than authors with low productivity. 
    The second part of the paper provides an empirical assessment of the model's prediction. The 
purpose of this section is to check the link between the quality of a researcher and the one of his / her 
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co-authors. For this purpose, we built an original database considering all economists with a position 
in a French university during the year 2004. In 2012, we collected their publication records in order to 
take into account the scientific work of these academics with at least 8 years of research experience. 
We then computed the h and g indexes of the academics and their co-authors and, in order to consider 
the number and the quality of the coauthors in a single one-dimensional variable, we built two meta 
indexes (hereafter the hh and gg indexes) by reference to the h and the g indexes
3
. More specifically, a 
hh index with value i indicates that the author has at least i co-authors with a h index superior or equal 
to i. A high hh index reveals that the author collaborates with a high number of influential co-authors. 
The gg index of an author is equal to i if i is the highest value for which the sum of the g-indexes of 
his/her i best co-authors is superior or equal to i
2
. The gg index focuses mainly on the influence of the 
co-authors. A gg index may take a high value when the author collaborates with a high number of 
influential co-authors or if some of the co-authors have a very high g index. Our prediction is that the 
hh index (resp gg index) of a given author is explained by the author's h (resp g) index. In other words, 
the more talented a academic is, the higher will be the number and the quality of his/her co-authors. 
The database incorporates several control variables in order to eliminate the influence of side effects 
such as age, gender, reputation, localization of the university. Basic results are consistent with 
existence of an assortative matching which leads academics of equivalent abilities to work together. 
From a methodological point of view, assessing the relationship between the characteristics of an 
academic with those of his/her co-authors raises two major issues. The first is linked to the excess 
number of zeros in the data. An important share of academics exhibit academic CVs without any 
scientific publication and consequently without any scientific collaboration. These zeros request a 
specific econometric treatment. A second difficulty appears as there is an obvious endogeneity issue in 
our model: the academic production of a researcher and the one of his/herco-authors are clearly 
interlinked and the h index (resp g index) of a given author could also be explained by his/her co-
author's productivity (as measured by the hh or the gg indexes). These two problems and their 
technical solutions will be considered in a separated section. 
Finally, one paradoxical consequence of our result is to emphasize the positive signaling role of co-
authorship. In their contribution, Fafchamps et al. (2010) stressed that co-authorship suffers from a 
free-rider curse. The imperfect information about the cooperative willingness of a potential co-author 
reduces the incentive to collaborate. They conclude that interpersonal links that allows getting private 
information on the cooperative behavior of an academic play an important role in team formation. 
However, as long as co-authoring appears as a voluntary choice, no long run collaboration seems 
feasible with an academic free rider. As remarked by Ishida (2009), repeated co-writings between the 
members of a same team thus constitute a signal of researchers’ collaborative behavior. Contrary to 
what had been presented in our first lines, co-authorship appears here as a positive signal of the 
researcher’s willingness to carry a part of the workload. In this paper, the positive nature of the co-
authorship signal is developed one step further. As academics with a lot of influent publications work 
and create links with a large number of influential co-authors, co-authoring with influent researchers 
appears as a signaling device of academics’ quality. In order to improve the information about 
researchers’ ability, co-authorship should be encouraged. 
                                                          
3
Meta indexes are often used in bibliometrics. For instance, Schubert (2012) computes a meta index to measure 
the characteristics of a researcher's network and Tol (2008) proposes a generalized g index to rank groups of 
researchers. 
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    The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model. Section 2 
provides the methodology of the empirical model. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 presents 
the empirical results. A last section concludes the paper. 
 
Section 1: A simple theoretical model 
 
    We consider a population of researchers of dimension one, each researcher being defined by his/her 
level of productivity q, with q∈[0,1]. At each point of time, Nature randomly matches couples of 
researchers and gives them the opportunity of a scientific collaboration. Researchers have then to 
decide if they accept or not this collaboration. When they accept to work together, authors co-write a 
paper and, after completion of their work, they are available for a new collaboration opportunity. If 
one of them refuses to collaborate, both will write their next paper alone. Authors make their choice in 
order to maximize their utility function in continuous time and with infinite horizon. 
 The Bellman equation 
    Denote       the discounted expected utility of a researcher with a productivity level Q (hereafter 
the Q-researcher) matched with a researcher with productivity q (the q-researcher). For the Q-
researcher, the expected utility before the random choice of a potential co-author is    
           
 
 
, where F(q) represents the cumulative distribution of the researchers' productivity.
4
 
   Let us define as Φ(Q) the subset of the q-researchers who would accept to work with the Q-
researcher. The expected utility of the Q-researcher matched with a given q-researcher obeys the 
following Bellman equation: 
        
                                   ∈ Φ   
               Φ   
           (1) 
Where : 
∙  U(Q) measures the instantaneous utility level of the Q-researcher who writes his/her next paper 
alone and U(Q,q) his/her utility in case of collaboration with the q-researcher. 
  ∙  β(Q) ∈ ]0,1[ is the discount rate associated with the time spent by the Q-researcher when he writes 
a paper alone and β(Q,q) ∈ ]0,1[the discount rate in case of collaboration. 
∙  The present value of the future collaboration opportunities is β(Q)WQ when the Q-researcher works 
alone and β(Q,q)WQ in the other case. 
According to the second line of Eq. (1), when the q-researcher refuses to co-work with the Q-author, 
q Φ(Q), both authors will write their next paper alone. The Q-researcher gets utility U(Q) and once 
his/her paper finished, he/she will be faced to a new opportunity of collaboration with an expected 
                                                          
4
The model assumes an homogenous distribution F() over the set of researchers. This implicitly means that a top 
tier economist will have the same probability to be matched with another leading economist as a researcher 
without any scientific activity. This is obviously a heroic assumption made for sake of simplicity. Considering 
differences in these distribution functions according to the productivity of each researcher would not modify the 
main insight of the model. 
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intertemporal value W
Q
. In the opposite case, q∈Φ(Q), the q-researcher accepts to work with the Q-
author. According to the first line of Eq. (1) the last one has to decide if he/she prefers to work alone 
(in this case the intertemporal reward is U(Q)+β(Q)WQ) or to collaborate, a decision which leads to the 
expected reward U(Q,q)+ β(Q,q) WQ. 
We assume that the higher the productivity of the Q-researcher, the higher the reward of his/her 
scientific production (iedU/dQ>0) and the faster the speed of one paper's production (ie :dβ/dQ>0). In 
case of collaboration, the discount factor β(Q,q) is an increasing function of co-autors' productivities, 
           ,dβ(Q,q)/dQ>0 and dβ(Q,q)/dq>0 and utility is increasing with the productivity of the 
two authors : U(Q) > U(Q,0), ∂U(Q,q)/∂Q>0, ∂U(Q,q)/∂q>0. 
 The cooperation thresholds 
    Consider first the case q∈Φ(Q) in which the q-researcher is willing to collaborate with the Q-
researcher. Consider the first line of Eq.(1). Given that the first term in the brackets is independent of 
q, and that the second term is increasing in q, the Q-researcher's optimal strategy consists in selecting a 
(reservation) productivity level     
 
and in accepting to work with any researcher with productivity 
above this value. According to this decision rule, the value function       is defined as : 
        
  
                          
 
  
                              
 
    ∈ Φ               (2) 
where     
 
 is implicitely defined by   
      
     
      
  , i.e.: 
             =        
           
               (3) 
    In an alternative way, Eq. (3) may be stated as: 
                
            
                                (4)       
Note that   is a sum of positive elements and is therefore positive. If we admit that working with a 
q-researcher allows to save time when this co-author presents a strictly positive productivity, we must 
have          
            for any     
     Thus, Eq. 4 states that a researcher may accept to 
collaborate on a paper of little interest, U(Q,    
 
) <U(Q), because collaboration allows to save time in 
the writing process.
5
 
In the general case, it is difficult to define analytically the relationship between Q and     
 
as defined 
by Eq. 4. The simulation in the next subsection shows that under rather credible assumptions     
 
 is 
an increasing function of Q. However, if a Q-researcher may refuse to work with poorly skilled 
authors, she/he must also realize that highly skilled researchers could refuse to work with her/him. By 
replication of the same argument, define    as the productivity of the researcher for which the 
reservation level of productivity is     
    . If     
  
 is an increasing function of   , any q-researcher 
with a productivity level above    will refuse to work with the Q-researcher. Productivity    thus 
appears as an upper threshold,     
    , for the Q-researcher who will only be able to cooperate with 
co-authors presenting a productivity in the range Φ    = [    
 
,    
 
]. 
                                                          
5
 This point is consistent with Medoff (2003) who emphasizes that collaboration doesn’t significantly improves 
scientific output. See also Fafchamps et al. (2010). 
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Finally, note that collaboration can only appear if some researchers accept to cooperate with less 
skilled authors. If Q<    
 
,  Q, researchers are only willing to co-work with authors more productive 
than themselves. In this case, any collaboration opportunity would be rejected by at least one of the 
two researchers. The documented generalization of co-authorship thus implies that Q>    
 
, and thus 
Q     
   for a majority of researchers. 
 
 The collaboration range 
    With a set of potential collaborators, Φ(Q) = [     
 
,    
 
], the value function       - Cf. Eq. 1 - 
may be restated as (note that     
 
=1 when every researcher is ready to accept a scientific 
collaboration with the Q-researcher): 
        
  
                          
            
 
  
                            
        
 
    ∈ Φ                   (5) 
With: 
      
         
    
 
 
    
         
    
 
    
     
         
 
    
                              (6) 
and where     
 
 and     
 
are implicitely defined by : 
 
                    
           
    
      
         
       
 
       
           
         
 
 
  
The threshold     
 
is defined in the range [0,    
 
] under the necessary and sufficient condition (see 
Appendice 1): 
    
      
 
        
 
 
          
 
 
                                                                     (7) 
Note that by construction     
 
and     
 
 are symmetrical with respect to the first bisector. Thus, 
when condition (7) is fulfilled,     
        
    and the Q-researcher will accept to write a paper 
with any q-researcher with productivity within the range     
      
  . In all other cases, the Q-
researcher always prefers to work alone. 
 Simulation 
    In order to get some intuition about the collaboration range, let us consider the additional 
assumptions: 
- Define as t(.) the time spent by a Q-researcher to write a paper with: 
 
 
      
 
   
   when the researcher wor s alone
       
 
     
    in case of collaboration
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Here, N is a constant that allows weighting the productivity's influence on writing time. For sake 
of simplicity, we will assume N=1 in the simulation. With this definition of t(), the discount factor 
respects the usual definition β(-)= e-rt(-), where r measures the researcher's discount rate. 
- Assume q to be distributed according to a uniform distribution on [0,1], with cumulative 
distribution       . 
- Assume U(Q)=Q, and U(Q,q)=[aQs/(s-1)+aqs/(s-1)](s-1)/s, i.e.: the joint production function presents a 
constant elasticity of substitution.
6
 
-  
Fig. 1 
    Fig. 1 presents the values (    
      
 
) for each Q-researcher under the previous assumptions with 
a=0.5, s=2, r=0.04. The curves     
 
 and     
 
 indicate the threshold values for each Q-researcher. 
They are symmetric with respect to the 45° line and computed starting from Q=1 (and therefore 
    
 
=1) and deducing the two threshold values for each lower level of productivity. 
    According to Eq. (5), authors with Q=1 would only accept to work with co-authors with 
productivity above     
  = A = Q∗. In another way, this implies that any researcher would accept to 
work with a colleague with a productivity level above Q∗. For any Q-author with Q>Q∗, the upper 
threshold takes the value     
 
=1. 
                                                          
6
Krapf (2014) uses the same production function to formalize the result of collaboration; Medoff (2007) uses a 
generalized form of the CES. 
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    The blue curve 0A indicates the     
 
 values for any Q-researcher for which     
 
=1. The symetric 
of this curve with respect to the 45° line - curve OA' - represents the inverse of the previous function. 
It gives the     
 
 values for researchers with productivity in the range [Q′,Q∗].7 As for any researcher 
with Q<Q∗, the upper threshold is less than one, authors become more demanding with their coauthors. 
The curve deviates from the blue curve OA and the spread between the two thresholds drops. The 
symmetric black curves in Fig 1.indicates the values (    
 
,    
 
) for Q<Q∗. 
    Three properties of the model deserve attention. First, when the two thresholds are non decreasing 
with productivity Q, the higher the researcher's productivity, the higher will be the skills of his/her co-
authors. Second, as the time spent on a paper is decreasing with the productivities of the researcher 
and of his/her potential co-authors, the number of papers written during a given period of time must be 
increasing with Q. Highly skilled authors must produce a higher number of papers (coauthored or not).  
Finally, as long as the Q-researcher's productivity is defined in the interval [0,Q∗], the spread 
[    
 
,    
 
], is increasing with Q, thus a talented author should more frequently meet authors prone to 
accept a collaboration. He should have more co-authored papers than an author with low productivity. 
For authors with productivity in the range, [Q∗,1], the link between productivity and the number of 
collaborations depends on the relative influence of a higher frequency of match with other researchers 
and the decrease in the probability that collaboration will be accepted. The number of coauthored 
papers may increase or slightly decrease with the productivity level of the Q-researcher. 
 
Section 2: Econometric Methodology 
 
In a nutshell, our theoretical model states that a highly skilled author should have more co-
authors of better quality. Thus, the econometric part of this paper aims at estimating a relationship 
such as: 
(2.1)                           for i=1, .., N and j=1, ..., M. 
where Qi stands for the quality of researcher i, Qi,co_authors represents the average quality of his co-
authors and                stands for exogenous variable j of researcher i.  
Two main issues arise in this case. Firstly, we will apply count data measures of either the 
individual research productivity or the quality of the co-authors (see next section for a presentation of 
the data). So we should apply count data econometrics to the former specification. Secondly, the 
academic production of a researcher is not independent of his co-authors’ productivity level8. Thus, 
there is an endogeneity issue in the data which could be address by the Two Stage Residual Inclusion 
approach (2SRI, Terza et al, 2008). 
  
                                                          
7
For instance, note that the Q∗-researcher's lower threshold is Q’=    
 ∗
. Thus, for the Q′-researcher, the upper 
threshold is     
  
=Q∗ on the OA' curve. 
8
 For example, in the case of a sample of French physicists, Mairesse and Turner (2005) demonstrate that 
individual productivity is explained by the quality of other researchers belonging to the same research center. 
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2.1- Count data with overdispersion and Excess zeros: ZIP and ZINB 
modeling 
Poisson regression models provide a standard framework to analyze count data
9
. However, in 
practice, count data suffer from two major drawbacks: overdispersion and excess of zeros. 
Overdispersion could stem from unobserved heterogeneity which causes the conditional variance of 
the sample to be larger than the conditional mean. The most frequently cited approach to address over 
dispersion is the negative binomial regression model. Another issue in count data modeling is a 
situation in which the number of zeros in the data exceeds what would typically be predicted by the 
Poisson distribution. Lambert (1992) has developed the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model to handle 
this case. In order to model both unobserved heterogeneity and excess zeros a Zero Inflated Negative 
Binomial (ZINB) model could be applied to the data (Greene, 1994). 
Zero inflated models suppose that the data generating process is different for the sample 
values equal to zero and those positive
10. There should be also a distinction between “structural zeros” 
(which are inevitable) and “sampling zeros” (which occur by chance)
11
. For example, we may assume 
that there are two different types of academics in the sample: those who would never collaborate (for 
ideological reasons, for example) and the others. Among those wishing to work with other economists, 
some have not collaborated since they have not found a researcher with whom working. Therefore 
there are two types of zeros among the observed values, but econometricians cannot distinguish 
between the two types of individuals. Lambert (1992) introduced the ZIP model in which the zeros 
values are the result of both a Poisson model and a logit decision process.  
In the ZIP model there are two different latent variables:    the collaboration decision variable 
of academic i, and   
∗ the potential quality level of his/her co-author. The observed quality level of the 
co-authors (             ) is then a function of these two latent variables: 
(2.2)                      
  
∗               
                
  
The probability function of the quality level of co-authors is then the following: 
(2.3)                   
                                                        
                                                      
  
where   ∈       is the probability that academic i will not collaborate (or the probability of a 
structural zero), and g(.) is the probability function of the parent count model. Excess zeros occur 
whenever     . The collaboration decision    will depend on a new latent variable   
∗ and it will be 
modeled with a logistic model: 
(2.4)               
              
∗      
         
              
∗      
         
  
                                                          
9
 See Ridout et al. (1998) for a review. 
10
See Garay et al. (2011) for a detailed analysis of zero inflated models. 
11
Staub and Winkelmann (2013) makes the distinction between structural or strategic zeros and incidental zeros. 
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where     are the exogenous variables involved in the decision process,    is a threshold value and    
is a residual following a logistic density function. Accordingly, the probability of a structural zero is 
defined as follows: 
  (2.5)    
        
    
          
    
 
A fully parametric zero-inflated model is then obtained once the probability function of the parent 
count model is specified. If g(.) is a Poisson probability function, then we get the ZIP model (Lambert, 
1992): 
  (2.6)  
                    
           
             
              
             
           
    
  
Where      are the exogenous variables explaining the expected value of the quality level of academic 
i’s co-authors. The mean of the zero-inflated count data model (i.e. the expected value of the quality of 
the co-authors) and its variance are then: 
  (2.7a)                                   
        
′    
          
′    
 
  (2.7b)                                           
The ZINB model is obtained if the g(.) function is a negative binomial distribution function, the new 
probability function of the quality level of co-authors is then (Garayet al, 2011): 
(2.8)                  
           
 
    
 
 
                                                                                                              
       
                  
                      
 
  
    
 
             
 
 
    
 
 
                              
  
Where      is the dispersion parameter and  (.) is the gamma function, then the first two 
conditional moments are defined as follows:  
(2.9a)                                     
(2.9b)                                                
Unobserved heterogeneity is linked to the parameter . If the coefficient  is different from 
zero there is unobserved heterogeneity in the data and the binomial model should be used instead of 
the Poisson model. Unobserved heterogeneity can be tested by a likelihood ratio test on parameter  
with the Vuong test. It is worth noting that the X2i variables can be identical to the X1i ones, overlap 
with X1i or be completely distinct from X1i. The parameters    and    can be interpreted respectively 
as the semi-elasticities of the parent model and the changes in the log-odds of strategic zeros.  
 The former specification implies that each subject is observed for the same time interval, 
referred to as the exposure. If different subjects have different exposures (  ), then the natural 
logarithm of the exposure must be included as an offset, a covariate with regression coefficient set to 1 
in the specification (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005): 
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  (2.10)       
′                
′            
The parameters of a zero-inflated model are estimated by a full maximum likelihood (ML) 
framework
12
.  
 
2.2 Addressing the endogeneity issue in count data: the 2SRI approach 
 Instrumental Variables (IV) methods are the most common framework for addressing the 
endogeneity. In linear models, the IV methodology corresponds to the Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) which is a two-step procedure. In non linear models, the Two Stages Prediction Substitution 
(2SPS) approach can be considered as the non-linear counterpart of the 2SLS estimation. 2SPS 
substitutes the endogenous regressors in the estimated equation with their consistent predicted values 
obtained in a first stage auxiliary regression. However, Wooldrige (2014) highlights that, when the 
conditional expectation model is non-linear, then 2SPS approach usually produces inconsistent 
estimates. He advocates applying the Two Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) approach which allows 
getting consistent estimates of the parameters in the structural regression. Terza et al (2008) provides 
the formal proof of consistency for the 2SRI approach.  
The 2SRI estimator has the same first-stage as 2SPS. However, in the second stage regression, the 
endogenous regressors are not replaced. Instead, the first-stage residuals of the auxiliary regressions 
are included as additional regressors in the second-stage estimation. Recently, Geraci et al. (2014) 
extended the 2SRI framework to count data models. They consider the following general non linear 
model for the conditional mean of the outcome (             ): 
  (2.11)                                                      
 
           
 
        
Where M(.) is a known non-linear function and the regressors can now be split up between two 
different components:             where xi is a set of K exogenous regressors and xei  is a set of S 
endogenous regressors (either discrete or continuous) possibly correlated with a set of S unobservable 
confounders latent variables (omitted variables) wi. Endogeneity of regressors xei may be modelled by 
the correlation between the unobserved confounder factors with xei and               (Terza et al. 
2008): 
 (2.12)                        s=1, ..., S  
where          , Zi is a set of at least S instrumental variables satisfying all the necessary 
conditions, and       is a set of S non-linear auxiliary equations.  
The 2SRI estimator is then obtained by estimating the following regression: 
 (2.13)                                             
                                                          
12
However, misspecified overdispersion in the model would invalidate ML inference but not the quasi-ML 
inference. Recently, Staub and Winkelmann (2013) proposed a Poisson quasi-likelihood (PQL) estimator that is 
robust to misspecification of the overdispersion.  
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Where     is a set of S estimated residuals  of the first stage equation.. Consistent standard errors of 
the second-stage parameters can be obtained by bootstrap (Wooldrige, 2012).  
In count data models, there is no consensus on how to define the residuals. Geraci et al (2014) 
advocates to compute two different measures: the raw residual (                   ) and the 
standardized residual (   
    
               
            
 
  
). If xei are count data variables, then the first-stage 
auxiliary regression can be modelled either by a ZIP or by a ZINB model and the two conditional 
moments can be computed as stated in equations (2.7) to (2.9). The exogeneity of xei can be tested via 
a conventional Wald-type statistics for                .  
Geraci et al. (2014) extends the literature by analyzing the small sample properties of the 2SRI 
estimators in count data models. They use Monte Carlo simulations in order to study the power of the 
exogeneity test and measure the bias of the structural coefficients. Their results show that the 2SRI 
method has good finite sample properties. Their empirical evidence shows that the power of the test is 
always higher using standardized residuals. Furthermore, applying standardized residuals leads to 
smaller bias in the endogenous regressors. 
 
Section 3: Data and Sample Characteristics 
 
3.1- The Database 
In order to study the relationship between the scientific performance of a researcher and the 
one of his/her co-authors, we built an original database mixing various sources of data. 
We used the "Tableau de classement du personnel enseignant titulaire et stagiaire", economics 
section, Ministry for Research (2004) to identify all the academics employed by French Universities 
on December 31th 2004. For each researcher, this official file allowed us to get information about 
gender, age, academic status (Full Professor or Assistant Professor) and the university assignment 
during the year of 2004.  
As it is now common in the literature, we used Google Scholar citation indexes in order to 
measure individual research productivity (Bosquet and Combes, 2012 and 2013). At the beginning of 
2012, we used the software "Publish or Perish" (PoP, Harzing 2010) to collect each academic CV from 
Google Scholar
13
. With this CV came information about the set of published papers, and, for each 
paper, the numbers of citations, the language used and the authors’ names. In a second round, we used 
PoP to compute the h and the g-indexes of each co-author.  
The raw data extracted from Google scholar present some important shortcomings. Authors 
with names identical to first names raise difficult problems of disambiguation. A query "Philippe 
Martin" would thus be credited indifferently with the work of Philippe M or Martin P. Authors with 
frequent French last name such as Petit are credited with papers from homonymous researchers. 
Married women, who use different author names during their academic life, often present 
                                                          
13
 In 2012, the software PoP offered the option to select papers according to specific subject areas. Our data 
record all papers identified within the option “Business, Administration, Finance, Economics” and “Social 
Sciences, Arts, Humanities”. 
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underestimated academic resume. In order to avoid these difficulties, we removed from the database 
the name of any author for which the disambiguation was hazardous. From an initial number of 1830 
names in the "Tableau de classement", we kept only 1566 researchers
14
.  
In order to complete the database, we got information about the research topics of each 
researcher by collecting the JEL codes of the papers included in our database and listed in Econlit. 
Finally, we used the dataset “Fichier Central des Thèses”
15
 to identify the name of the PhD supervisor 
and the year of the PhD defense. For foreign PhD or unrecorded thesis in this dataset, information was 
obtained through individual searches on the net. 
With this information, we then computed four indexes of productivity for each researcher. 
 Individual Productivity Indexes 
We computed first the authors' h and g indexes in order to have a synthetic measure of the 
quantity (number of papers) and the quality (number of citations by paper) of the researcher’s 
academic production. By definition, the h index of an researcher is equal to x if x of his N papers have 
received at least x citations each, and the others (N-x) papers have received no more than x citations 
each (Hirsh, 2005). One drawback of this measure is that two different academics may exhibit similar 
h indexes even if their respective best papers get a very different number of citations. In order to 
address this limit, Egghe (2006) has proposed the g index as the (unique) largest number such that the 
top g articles received (together) at least g
2 
citations. By definition the g index is at least equal or larger 
than the h index.  
There are large empirical evidences showing that citations have a more important effect on 
academic earnings than the number of publication. For example, Hamermesh et al. (1982) on a sample 
of 148 full professors of seven large US universities proves that an increase in the total number of 
citations by one unit has a larger effect on academic wages than one additional published paper. 
However, given the load of criticisms addressed to the h and the g indexes (see for instance Bornmann 
and Daniel 2007), we also built two additional productivity indexes grounded on the quality of the 
medium in which papers were published (journals, books, or working papers series). Both indexes are 
built following the methodology used since 2005 by the juries of the French “Concours National 
d’Agrégation pour le recrutement des professeurs d’économie” leading to the hiring of new full 
professors in economics (for a description of this nationwide competition, see Combes et al, 2013c). 
These indexes are defined as the sum of individual score values given to each recorded paper, the 
scores being computed as the ratio between the weight of the medium of publication and the square 
root of the number of the paper’s authors.  
The first index, denoted LLG index, is computed according to the discrete weight function 
implemented by the jury of the “Concours 2008” (Levy-Garboua 2008) and grounded on the CNRS 
(2012) ranking of economic journals. This ranking considered 6 categories of economic journals: the 
main journals are graded from 1 (the top tier journals) to 4 (the less influential).  Two additional 
categories: MAD (multidisciplinary) and NR (new journals) were also introduced in order to consider 
multidisciplinary or promising new journals. Following the jury of the “Concours 2008”, we therefore 
gave 6 points for each publication in a journal graded 1 by the CNRS, 4 for any journal with a grade of 
2, 2 when the journal is credited with a grade of 3 and 1 for a grade of 4. Articles published in journals 
                                                          
14
 This choice implies that some of the most productive researchers have been removed from the database. 
15
The “Fichier Central des Thèses” is a French database created in 1968 to identify every thesis being prepared in 
French universities. 
Individual Productivity in Research and Co-authorship in economics  Page 15 
 
listed in categories MAD (multidisciplinary) and NR (new journals) by the CNRS were credited with a 
weight of 1. Finally, any publication listed in Econlit but not in the CNRS ranking received a weight 
of 0.5. This allowed distinguishing non producing researchers from active researchers publishing only 
in books or in journals with weak economic impact.  
The second index, denoted CL, follows the same methodology but considers only papers listed 
in Econlit journals. In this index, weights are taken from the Combes and Linnemer (2010) ranking of 
the Econlit journals. In order to make their classification, Combes and Linnemer defined two scores 
values (Clm or Clh) from 0 to 100 for each of the 1205 journal listed in Econlit. Both scores reflect the 
same ranking of the journals but the CLh is more selective giving higher weights to the top tier 
journals and lower one to less influential journals. In our paper, the CL index is built according to the 
CLm weight
16
. Note that the CL index neglects papers published in books, working papers or journals 
ignored by Econlit and therefore gives an elitist measure of productivity. 
According to this methodology, a researcher with one paper written with one coauthor and 
published in the American Economic Review (with a CLm weight of 98.1 in the Combes and 
Linnemer’s ranking and listed in category 1 by the CNRS) and a paper published alone in a book 
would have a LLG index equal to 4,74 (i.e.: 6/1.414 plus 0.5) and a CL index of 69,37 (i.e.: 
98.1/1.414). These two additional variables will allow us to perform some robustness checks. 
 Co-authors index 
In order to summarize both the productivity and the number of a researcher’s co-authors, we 
also computed two Meta indexes denoted hh and gg by reference to the h and the g indexes. By 
definition, the hh index of a researcher will be equal to n if n of his/her N co-authors have at least a h 
index equal to n, and the other (N-h) co-authors have a h index less than n. In a same way, the gg 
index will be equal to n if the sum of the g indexes of his/her n best coauthors is superior or equal to n² 
(the square of the rank) and the sum of the g indexes of the n+1 best coauthors is inferior to (n+1)². 
These two indexes aim at giving in a one-dimensional variable a measure of both the number 
and the quality of a researcher's coauthors. A high gg index indicates that an author works with authors 
presenting high g indexes (some of the co-authors have published very influential papers). For 
instance if the g index of these co-authors are g1 = 15; g2 = 12; g3 = 4; g4 = 3; g5 = 2; g6=0, the gg 
index will be equal to 6 (the sum of the g index for the 6 best co-authors is equal to 36 which is equal 
to the square of the rank). A high hh index indicates that a researcher presents a high number of 
productive co-authors (with high h indexes). An author who presents 5 coauthors with the following h 
index, h1 = 15; h2 = 12; h3 = 4; h4 = 3; h5 = 2 will have an hh index equal to three: only three co-
authors present a h higher than 3. 
These two Meta indexes present the main advantage of taking into account both the quality 
and quantity dimension in co-authorship issue. We will also analyze the total number of different co-
authors (“NB_COAUTHORS” variable) of an academic i in order to study a potential trade-off 
between quality and quantity in the choice of coauthors. 
 
 Control variables 
                                                          
16
 The index built on CLh weight scheme was too selective to provide conclusive empirical results, especially 
when it was compared to the h and g conclusions. 
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For each author the following additional variables have been computed: 
- “FEMALE” ” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual academic is a woman: this variable 
allows taking into account a gender effect on the publishing strategy of an individual, if any. 
- “AGE” stands for the age of the individual so this variable could control for a kind of generation 
effect. The influence of this variable on the quality and quantity of co-authors may be ambiguous. 
Indeed, due to the increasing pressure for publication, "young" researcher may want to write more 
papers and therefore may be looking for an increasing number of co-workers. On the other hand, 
young researchers may want to signal their quality by avoiding publishing their first papers with 
co-authors. 
- “NUMBER_YEARS” stands for the number of years since the PhD defense. This variable is a 
proxy for the academic professional experience. It is worth noting that for each academic, the h, g, 
hh or gg indexes are computed from the beginning of his/her academic career with a different time 
exposure for each individual of the sample. In the empirical model we will apply the professional 
experience variable as an offset one. 
- Academic position: We also control for the rank position of the individual in the academic career: 
assistant professor (“MCF”) or full professor (“PR”) with dummy variables17. There are three 
types of ranking for full Professor: - “Classe Exceptionnelle” (PR_CE), “Première Classe” 
(PR_1C) and  “Seconde Classe” (PR_2C) - and two for Assistant Professor- “Hors Classe” 
(MCF_HC) and “Classe Nornale” (MCF_CN)-. These variables could also reveal the quality of an 
academic as the promotion from one position to another one (say from MCF to PR_2C or PR_2C 
to PR_1C) depends on a national competition where the number and the quality of publications 
plays a dramatic role. 
- Language of publication: when papers are published in journals, we identified its language of 
publication and compute for each researcher the share of their papers published in English 
(SHARE_GB), in French (SHARE_FR) or in other languages (SHARE_OTHER). 
- “WORK_ALONE_ONLY”: this dummy variable is equal to 1 if academic i has published at least 
one paper during his/her academic career and has always refused to co-author a paper.  
- “NB_PAPERS” stands for the number of papers listed in Google Scholar for the individual 
researcher. This variable can be considered as a quantitative measure of the level of production of 
an individual academic. 
- Papers’ quality: the CNRS classification of economics journals plays a dramatic role in the 
assessment of economic research in France, both at individual and institutional levels. According 
to this classification, journals are split in 4 categories (from one to four) with an index decreasing 
with the quality level of the journals. The top tier journals are thus listed in the CNRS1 category, 
and the less influent in category 4. Until recently, the CNRS also defined a list of multidisciplinary 
journals publishing economic papers. We used the classification 2008 to measure papers’ quality 
by splitting up the researchers papers in 7 different categories: CNRS_1 to CNRS_5, 
ECONLIT_NO_CNRS and MISCELLANEOUS_PAPERS. Variables CNRS_1 to CNRS_4 
indicate the number of papers published by a given researcher in the four main categories of 
journals. CNRS_5 stands for papers published in multidisciplinary (MAD) and new journals (NR). 
The variable ECONLIT_NO_CNRS records the publications in journals that are referenced by the 
Econlit database but not by the CNRS and, at least, variable MISCELLANEOUS_PAPERS counts 
all other items (papers published in journals not referenced by either the CNRS or the Econlit 
database, working papers and books). 
                                                          
17
In French academia remains the old « Maître Assistant » status which only survives in a few cases. We merge 
academics with this status in the group of MCF_CN. 
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- HERFINDAHL_JEL_CODE: The propensity to publish and to engage in co-authorship 
relationships varies greatly according to the various economic topics. Economic fields of research 
might exhibit very different rates of co-authorship because they do not belong to the same 
economic tradition (Witte and Schulze, 2009). Following a now standard methodology (see for 
instance Fafchamps et al., 2010, Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011 or Bosquet and Combes 
2013a) we collected the JEL (Journal of Economic Literature) codes of the papers included in our 
database and listed in Econlit and we identified the economic topics through the letter of the 
papers’ JEL Classification codes.18We then computed a Herfindahl index of the different letters’ 
JEL code used by a researcher in order to measure the researchers’ degree of specialization: the 
higher the value of the Herfindahl index, the more the researcher is specialized. A Herfindahl 
index equal to 1 means that all the publications of the researcher are classified in only one JEL 
category
19
. 
- WORK_ALONE_ONLY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if faculty member i has published at least 
one paper during his/her academic career and he has no co-authors. 
- “COWRITE_DR” is a dummy variable equal to one if the academic has written at least one paper 
with his/her supervisor. If this collaboration reflects the assessment of the student’s quality by the 
supervisor, it may constitute a signal of quality for a young researcher; its effect is expected to be 
positive. 
- Finally we also control for network effects with the two different variables. Firstly, the 
“UNIVERSITY_NAME” variable is the university assignment of the individual in 2004. This is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual works in the assigned university. In our dataset there 
are 90 different institutions (universities, “Grande Ecole”). We assume that belonging to academic 
institutions with large economic departments which are recognized nationally and internationally 
can facilitate the matching with complementary co-authors
20
.  
- Secondly, we compute the “PhD DEFENDED AT” variable. This variable divides the set of 
authors into 11 categories according to the academic institution where the individual researcher 
has defended his PhD. It comprises nine French academic institutions (University of Toulouse 1, 
Paris 1, Paris 9, Paris 10, the others universities in Paris, Aix-Marseilles, Strasbourg, a group of 12 
different “Grande Ecole” institutions and all the others French universities)21and two categories 
listing foreign institutions (the PhD has been defended in either an European country or in the 
United States). 
 
 Choice of Instruments 
It is well- nown that IV estimators’ efficiency relies on the quality of the instruments. 
Endogeneity issue arises because of unobserved heterogeneity in the data, possibly stemming from 
unobserved individuals’ characteristics, which implies that the dependent variable is correlated with 
some regressors in the equation. So in our case a good instrument requires two assumptions: (i) to be 
                                                          
18
We also controlled on the researcher’s main field of research considering this field as the one in which a 
researcher has the highest JEL figure. In the paper at hand, this variable didn’t prove to be significant. 
19
We computed a normalized Herfindahl index which means that this variable ranges from 0 (no specialization) 
to 1 (full specialization). 
20
 As recently showed by Bosquet and Combes (2013b), the network effect is better measured at the level of the 
economic departments rather than universities. However in our dataset, we were unable to obtain this 
information. 
21
This classification corresponds broadly to the international departments of French academia defined recently 
by Bosquet et al (2013c). 
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highly correlated with the individual research productivity level and (ii) to be uncorrelated with the 
quality of co-authors. Getting such an instrument is a challenging issue because a lot of potential 
variables may explain both individual and co-authors quality. 
In this paper we used as instrument the best quality paper published alone by an academic. This 
variable could be interpreted as a signal regarding the researcher’s intrinsic skill level. Again we 
turned in part to the CNRS classification in order to measure papers quality and we relied on the seven 
categories already discussed. For example, “BEST_ALONE_CNRS1” is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the researcher has published alone at least one paper in the first category of the CNRS classification.  
 
3.2- Some Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 1 are reported some descriptive statistics of our database. In 2004, 28% of French 
academic economists were women. The average academic is 47 years old and has around 15 years of 
professional experience
22
. In order to analyze the impact of different generations of academics, we 
have split-up the professional experience variable into 8 different cohorts. For example, the variable 
“Cohort64_68” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has defended his PhD dissertation 
between 1964 and 1968. Individuals belonging to this cohort have on average 37 years of post PhD 
experience against 3 years for individuals belonging to the last cohort (“Cohort99_04”). Around 1.3% 
of academics are members of the first cohort and they are on average 65 year old. For the last cohort, 
the figures are respectively 13.6% and 34 years old. Around 30% of French academics in our sample 
have started their career between 1983 and 1993 and 36% between 1994 and 2004. About 65% of 
academics are Assistant Professors and 35% are Full Professor.  
Considering researchers’ productivity indexes, 22.5% of French academics have never produced a 
paper referenced by Google Scholar during their career (table 1). The average French economist has 
published around 8 papers in his career in the whole sample. This average number of papers is equal to 
11 in the sub-sample of publishing academics
23
. There is a huge heterogeneity between academics as 
regards their production as the number of papers listed by Google Scholar for each researcher ranges 
from 0 to 157. On average, about 40% of the publishing academics have produced between 1 and 4 
papers during their career
24
. As regards the quality dimension of the research outcome, the estimated 
mean of respectively the h index and g index are 3.25 and 6.02. So according to the h index, French 
academics have published 3.25 papers on average with 3.25 citations each
25
. Again there is a huge 
heterogeneity in “quality” among French academics as the h and g indexes range from 0 to 39 and 0 to 
84 respectively. 
                                                          
22
In 2004, the professional experience variable ranges from 0 to 39 years. 
23
The average numbers of papers per year of experience are respectively 0.46 and 0.59. This implies that on 
average each researcher has published one paper every two year. It is worth noting that this figure corresponds to 
the new requirement of the HCERES (Haut Conseil de l’Evaluation de la Recherche et de l’Enseignement 
Supérieur), the national agency for the research evaluation in France, to consider an academic as a publishing 
one. 
24
 52% of the publishing academics have produce between 1 and 6 papers during their career. 
25
Our results are in line with those obtained by Bosquet and Combes (2013a). Indeed these authors estimated an 
average g index of 7.25 on a sample of 2,782 French academic economists between 1969 and 2008. One may 
explain this discrepancy by different kinds of population under study. In our sample, we only take into account 
academics that have a position in a French university whereas Bosquet and Combes consider also all full-time 
researchers from the CNRS and the INRA (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique). These last two 
kinds of academics do not have teaching loads and may have higher research productivity. 
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Some simple correlations between the different individual research productivity indicators are 
reported in table 2. All correlation estimates are significantly different from zero. As expected, the 
correlation between the h and g indexes (0.95) is almost perfect. It is worth noting that the correlation 
is also positive and high (0.66) between the citations scores (the h or g indexes) and the Econlit 
publication scores (the CL_index). Academics who have published more papers on top ranked journals 
receive more citations for each publication
26
. It is also worth noting that the LLG_index is more 
correlated with the quality measures of Econlit publication (0.90) than with the citations scores (0.73). 
Regarding the quality of publications, only 1.98% of the publishing academics have never 
published in a journal referenced either by the CNRS or by Econlit (see table 1). French academic 
economists who develop a research activity choose to publish in journals listed by the CNRS as their 
career evolution depends mainly on that particular classification: it represents 85.2% of the total 
number of papers published in a journal. The papers’ quality as measured by the CNRS classification 
is quite low. Indeed around 79% of the total number of published papers belong to the two lowest 
quality categories (CNRS3 and CNRS4), whereas 13% belong to the CNRS2 category and only 7% to 
the top ranked category CNRS1
27
. Note that 62.5% of the published papers are drafted in French 
against 34.8% in English (see table 1). Again there are huge discrepancies between the different 
generations of academics: more than 75% (respectively 17%) of the papers are drafted in French 
(English) for academics who started their career before 1968 (our first generation) against only 52.9% 
(45.1% respectively) for those who started in 1999 (our last generation, see table 5).  
We turn now to comment co-authorship indicators. On average each French academic has 4.5 
different co-authors in the whole sample and 6.9 co-authors in the sub-sample of academics which 
engage in co-authorship (see table 1)
28
. 44% of publishing academics of the sample have between 1 
and 3 co-authors. It is worth noting that 34.8% of the individuals in the sample have never had a co-
author whereas 17.4% have never published a paper by their own. About 15% of the individuals in the 
sample have written at least one paper with their PhD supervisor. The mean of the hh Meta index 
which summarizes both the number and the quality of co-authors is 3.2 and the index ranges from 0 to 
29. There is over dispersion in the data as the hh index variance is 11.7. A similar result is obtained 
with the gg index with an even larger range of variation: the mean and variance are equal respectively 
to 7.4 and 74.1 (see table 1). 
In table 3 and table 4 are reported some statistics by gender and by academic position. The most 
striking feature is that, on average, individual research productivity indexes are lower for women than 
for men. The lower research productivity level of women could be explained by the fact that they 
published fewer papers (5 papers on average for a woman against 10 for a man). This gender effect is 
even more pronounced if individual research quality is measured by the CL index and the LLG index 
variables
29
. A gender gap can also be noticed in the co-authorships issue: women had on average a 
fewer number of coauthors of lower quality (see table 3). However, these results will be slightly 
challenged in the econometric model.  
                                                          
26
These results are again in line with those obtained by Bosquet and Combes (2012) on a sample of 2,832 French 
economist academics for the year 2010. 
27
This result might be explained by the fact that the majority of the French economic journals are classified by 
the CNRS as belonging mainly to the third and fourth category. In the 2008 classification, only one French 
economic journal is classified as category 2 and none is classified as category 1. 
28
The overdispersion issue is even more important in this case as the variance is equal to twelve times the mean. 
29
 This fact could be in part explained by the fact that women in our sample are younger than men: they are 42 
years old on average versus 48 year old for men (see table 4). Younger women in our data set could be explained 
in turn by the increasing participation of women in academia, especially since the eighties (see table 5). 
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Regarding academic position, there is an overrepresentation of men compared to women (42% 
against 17%) amongst Full Professors. If on average an academic has 4.5 coauthors, a Full Professor 
has on average 8 coauthors against 2.6 for an Assistant Professor (see table 4). 
As regards fields of economics, the specialization of French academics is quite low. The average 
value of the Herfindahl JEL Code index is 0.31, but there is a high heterogeneity between French 
academics (see table 1). Few academics have all their publications in one main field (only 8.2% of the 
sample). The ranking (by decreasing importance) of the most cited fields are the following: D 
(Microeconomics), O (Economic Development, Technical Change and Growth), F (International 
Economics), L (Industrial Organization), E (Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics, B (History of 
economic thought, Methodology and Heterodox Approaches) and J (Labor and Demographic 
Economics). 
Cohort effects play a critical role in France. According to Raubert and Ursprung (2008), countries 
whose national academic system has been subject to important institutional changes may be 
characterized by significant cohort effect in research productivity as it was the case in Germany. A 
similar argument may be raised in France as can be observed from data reported in table 5. We 
compute individual productivity and co-authorship indexes per experience year by entry cohort. All 
variables have a similar pattern and exhibit a structural break in the mid-eighties. For example, the 
number of co-authors per year remains quite stable for researchers belonging to the first four cohorts, 
then there is a huge increase for individuals entering in the academic career in the mid-eighties 
(cohort84_88). Since then there has been a steadily increase in the number of co-authors per year. A 
similar evolution is obtained for individual productivity indexes (h, g, CL_index and LLG_index). 
Younger cohorts are more productive and they engage more in co-authorship activities.  
Hereafter, we use the best paper published alone as the instrumental variable in the paper. Some 
descriptive statistics on this instrument are reported in the bottom part of table 1. As expected the 
number of researchers publishing alone declines when the quality level of journals increases. Indeed 
there are around 6% of the 1566 academics that have succeeded to publish alone at least one paper in 
the CNRS1 category, 9.5% in the CNRS2, 27% in the CNRS3 and 11% in the CNRS4. 
 
Section 4: Empirical Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Studying the relationship between the characteristics of a researcher and those of his/her co-
authors is tricky as individual research productivity should be an endogenous regressor: the quality of 
a researcher’s publication depends somehow on the quality of his co-authors30. So in order to evaluate 
the effect of the level of its own research productivity on the co-authors quality, this endogeneity bias 
should be addressed. We start by commenting the results of the 2SRI estimations and then we will 
check the robustness of our results. 
                                                          
30
This relationship has been put forward by various empirical studies. For instance, Azoulay et al. (2010) shows 
that co-authors of a superstar suffer a lasting 8 to 18% decline in their quality-adjusted publication output 
following his death. Chung et al (2009) states that co-authored papers are cited more frequently, and that in the 
case of asymmetric partnerships collaborating with a higher quality author seems to pay off. Recently, Bosquet 
and Combes (2013a) finds that an author who increases on average his/her number of co-authors from two to 
three is cited 53.4% more and his/her g index will be 41.8% higher.  
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4.1 Empirical Results: IV estimation outputs 
2SRI is a two-step approach. In the first step, the endogenous regressors are modelled with the 
exogenous regressors and the instrumental variables in order to compute the standardized residuals. In 
the second step, the structural model is estimated and the standardized residuals are included as 
additional explanatory variables in the regression. 
First-Stage empirical results: exogenous determinants of research productivity measures 
Both research productivity variables (the h and g indexes) are explained by some exogenous 
demographic variables, a gender effect and finally the instrumental variable. As there is over 
dispersion in the data (see table 1), ZINB modeling has been applied to research productivity 
indicators. Results are reported in table 5
31
.The Vuong test compares zero-inflated models with an 
ordinary Poisson regression model (the null hypothesis). As the Vuong test rejects the null hypothesis 
whatever the productivity measure applied, a zero-inflated model is better than a Poisson regression
32
 
(see table 6 column 1). Furthermore, the likelihood ratio tests show that the null hypothesis of no 
unobserved heterogeneity is rejected at the 1% level whatever the productivity variable applied (again 
in the case of the h index, the statistic is equal to 589.77 with a p-value of 0%). So these two tests 
indicate that individual research productivity measures should indeed be estimated with a ZINB 
model. 
Regarding the determinants of the decision to undertake some research activity, the inflate 
coefficients of the two productivity measures provides similar conclusions. The age and the gender 
variables have a significant positive effect on the log odds of an inflated zero, and the dummy variable 
“Wor ing_alone_only” has a non-significant effect. In the case of the age variable, the estimate ranges 
from 0.16 to 0.22. For example, regarding the h index results, an additional one year old will increase 
the log odds of an inflated zero by 0.22 (see the inflate model in table 6 column 1). In other words, the 
older the researcher, the more likely is the fact that not having published a paper is a deliberate 
decision. There is a gender effect as being a woman increases the log odds of not publishing by 2.33 in 
the case of the h index
33
. We have also introduced in the regression some cohort dummy variables in 
order to model life cycles in research productivity (see below for further details). In the case of the h 
index specification, five out of the six cohort dummies are significant against only three out of 6 for 
the g index case. 
We turn now to comment the results for the parent model of the research quality measures 
based on citation scores. The level of these individual research productivity measures may be 
interpreted as the effort allocated by each academic to research. The number of year of professional 
experience (the “number_years” variable) is the offset variable as each researcher has different time 
exposure. The evidence regarding the existence of a gender effect is mixed as the dummy female 
variable is significant in the h index specification but not in the g index specification (see table 6 
columns 1 and 2). Being a woman cuts the expected h index estimate by 14%. As expected the age 
variable has negative impact on the research productivity of an individual as the IRR estimates are 
below 1 in both cases. So younger economists tend to be more productive: for example, the expected 
                                                          
31
According to Staub and Winkelmann (2013) identification of all parameters in a ZINM model is achieved if at 
least one variable in X2 is not included in X1. 
32
For example, in the case of the h index, the statistic is equal to 3.58 with a p-value equal to 0.2%. 
33
The estimate is lower for the other productivity measure, but it remains significant. 
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change of h index if an individual has an additional year old is -0.012 (ln(0.988491))
34
. However, the 
age effect on the research productivity is rather fragile as the age variable is significant only at the 
10% level in the case of the h index. So the age effect doesn’t seem to be an important determinant of 
French academics research productivity. 
Research productivity may also vary across historical times because of institutional changes 
(Raubert and Ursprung, 2008 and Hamermesh, 2015). We include cohort dummies in the specification 
in order to capture this effect. There is strong evidence for the presence of life cycles in research 
productivity in our sample of French academics. The reference dummy cohort is the last one (i.e. 
academics that have defended their PhD after the year 1999), all the seven cohort dummies are 
significant whatever the measure of co-authorship applied. Most of these dummy variables are 
significant at the 1% level. The IRR estimates of the cohort dummies are increasing over time 
implying that the coefficients are decreasing over time as expected (see table 6 columns 1 and 2). For 
example, an academic having defended his PhD between the years 1969-1973 exhibits a 41% lower h 
index than that of the reference group. If the PhD has been defended between during the period 1989-
1993, the decrease in the h index is only around 22%. The reason of this phenomenon should be very 
similar to the one put forward by Rauber and Ursprung (2008) in the case of Germany. Over the last 
forty years, French academics have been increasingly exposed to the Anglo-Saxon research tradition 
that rewards researchers according to their own research productivity efforts. Furthermore, 
bibliometrics has become increasingly significant in evaluating individual researchers in French 
academic system since the nineties (Académie des Sciences, 2011). 
Most importantly, our selected instrumental variables are significant and they have the 
expected signs on research productivity. Indeed the coefficients of the “best alone publication” 
dummies are increasing according to the quality of journals whatever the measure of research 
productivity applied. For example, in the case of the h index, the estimated IRR coefficients for 
“Best_alone_CNRS1” and “Best_alone_CNRS4” are respectively equal to 4.87 and 1.86. These 
results imply that an individual that has published alone in a journal belonging to the CNRS category 1 
(the best quality) has on average a 487% increase in his expected productivity whereas the expected 
increase in productivity will be solely of 86% if his best publication alone is the CNRS category 4 (the 
lowest quality)
35
.  
 
Second-stage empirical results: IV estimation results of the determinants of co-authorship 
In Table 7 are reported the empirical results of the determinants of co-authorship by the 2SRI 
methodology. We analyze the co-authorship decision both in terms of quality with the number of 
citations (the hh and gg indexes) and in terms of quantity (the number of co-authors). According to 
Geraci et al (2014)’s Monte Carlo results, for applied research the best model is a ZINB or a ZIP 
model with standardized residuals with non-corrected standard errors of the parameters. In every 
specification the standardized residual variables are significant. Furthermore, the four Wald tests 
always reject at the 1% level the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the individual research productivity 
variables. So the 2SRI methodology must be implemented in order to address the endogeneity issue in 
the data (see the bottom part of table 7, columns 1 to 4). 
                                                          
34
We have also introduced in the specification the age squared variable, but this variable was never significant. 
35
The reference here is not having published a paper. 
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Once a network effect taken into account, the likelihood ratio test no more rejects the null 
hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity in the case of the hh index. In this case the best model is 
the ZIP model. If the dependent variable is the gg index, the selected model is the ZINB: indeed the 
likelihood ratio test the null of no heterogeneity is always rejected and the Vuong test also rejects the 
null hypothesis of a Poisson model (see table 7 columns 3 and 4). 
Regarding the determinants of the collaboration decision, the inflate coefficient of the 
individual research productivity variable has always a negative and significant effect (see inflate 
model in table 7 columns 1 to 4). For example, when the co-authorship quality is measured by the hh 
index, the inflate coefficient of h suggests that for each unit increase in h the log odds of an inflated 
zero decrease from a minimum value of 3.37 up to a maximum of 3.41 (table 7, inflate model columns 
1 and 2)
36
. In other words, the higher the research productivity level of an academic is, and the less 
likely is the decision of never collaborate. More productive academics tend to engage more in co-
authorships. The variable “Age” has a negative but never significant effect on the decision of not co-
writing papers whatever the research productivity measure. Estimates of a gender effect on the 
collaboration decision are never significant. Again, some cohort dummies are also significant in the 
decision of engaging in co-authorship. 
We turn now to comment the results for the parent model of the quality measures of co-
authorship based on citation scores. Again, the professional experience variable is used as the offset 
variable. The h index (respectively the g index) of an individual has a positive and significant effect at 
the 1% level effect on the hh index (respectively the gg index). The IRR coefficient for the h index 
ranges from 1.109 to 1.126 (table 7, columns 1 and 2), implying that if the h index increases by 1%, 
then the expected value of co-authors quality level increase will range from 10.9% to 12.6%. In the 
case of the gg index, estimates are lower (around 2.1%) but remain significant (columns 3 and 4). 
These results confirm our theoretical model stating that the co-authors research quality of an 
economist depends on his own research quality.  
As expected the age variable has a significant and negative impact on the quality of the co-
authors at the 1% level. The average of the IRR coefficient estimate is around 0.985: thus the expected 
decrease of quality of co-authors if an individual has an additional year old is 0.015 (- ln(0.985)). 
Again the existence of a gender effect is fragile. The gender variable is only significant with the hh 
measure of co-authorship quality. In this case, being a woman reduces the expected quality of co-
authors by around 15%. Publishing a paper with his/her PhD supervisor has a positive and significant 
effect (at the 1% level) on the quality of the future co-authors. The estimated IRR for “cowrite_dr” is 
around to 1.26, implying that an individual that has published at least one paper with his/her PhD 
supervisor has on average a 26% increase of the expected quality of his co-authors. This result could 
be explained by a reputation effect. Co-writing with his/her student may signal an implicit recognition 
by a supervisor of the quality of this student. For a young researcher in French academia, publishing 
with his PhD supervisor may be a signal of efficiency. The rank position has also a positive and 
significant effect on the quality of co-authors. Compared to an assistant professor at the standard level 
(MCF_CN), being a full professor improves the hh index (respectively the gg index) by 20.4% (resp. 
27.2%) for a full professor at the highest level (PR_CE) and by 13.25% (12.9%) for a full professor at 
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As regards the gg index, the estimated coefficients are around -0.75. 
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the first level (PR_2C). Oddly enough, being an assistant professor at the last level (MCF_HC) 
reduces by around 12% the hh index and by 11% the gg index but coefficients are not significant
37
. 
As in the case of the individual research productivity, there are significant life-time cycles in 
the quality of co-authors. Indeed the IRR coefficients of the cohort dummies are increasing over time 
either with the hh index as dependent variable or with the gg index. Thus younger cohorts are 
collaborating with better quality co-authors. As most cohorts dummies are non-significant in the 
inflate model, the life-time cycles should have a very small impact on the probability of never 
collaborating with other economists however, they have a positive effect over time on the expected 
value of the co-authors quality.  
Interesting results are obtained regarding the link between the number of papers and their 
quality and the co-authorship decision. As expected the CNRS classification of journals has a huge 
effect on the selection of the co-authors, but surprisingly the effect of journals quality goes in the 
reverse direction. Indeed, the IRR coefficient of the number of papers published in top quality level 
journals (CNRS1) is significant but below one whatever the measure of the quality of co-authors 
applied (hh index or gg index), implying that the number and the quality of co-authors decrease with 
the increase in the number of papers published in the CNRS1 category. On the contrary, the IRR 
coefficient is significant (only in the case of the gg index) and above one (in all cases) as regards 
papers published in the CNRS2 category, implying an increase in the number and in the quality of co-
authors in this case. In general, the number of papers published in the others CNRS categories 
(CNRS3, CNRS4, and CNRS5) have a non-significant effect
38
.This result could be interpreted in the 
following way: academics may have a strategic behavior when dealing with the collaborating issue. To 
successfully publish in journals classified as CNRS2, an academic decides to collaborate with a higher 
number of coauthors or with more productive coauthors
39
. On the contrary, academics who have a 
sufficient level of research productivity to publish in top ranked journals (here CNRS1 journals) prefer 
working with less coauthors in order to reap a higher prestige of the publications.
40
 
Publication language also plays an important role in the empirical model. This result is not 
surprising because in general English journals have a higher impact factor than French ones in all 
rankings. The IRR coefficient of the share_gb variable is larger than one and highly significant: an 
increase by 1% in the share of paper written in English raises the hh index (respectively the gg index) 
by 32.4% (48.9%). Two arguments may explain this relationship. On a first hand, French economists 
may be interested in developing international collaborations in order to produce papers in better 
English and to publish in more influential journals (for the influence of English proficiency on 
research performance, see Olney 2015). On the second hand, proficiency in English is a necessary 
condition to meet efficient co-authors and engage collaboration with more authors of better quality. In 
both cases, publishing in English contributes to increase the number and the quality co-authors. 
Finally economic fields are also an important determinant in the co-authorship issue. As 
expected, an increase in the level of economic specialization, that is an increase in the JEL Herfindahl 
                                                          
37
This result might stem from the fact that the transition from MCF_CN to MCF_HC should depend more on the 
age of an individual than on the quality of his publications in the French academic system. 
38
If the dependent variable is the gg index, then the number of papers published in the CNRS3 category has also 
a significant effect. 
39
Another interpretation is the following: French academics who are trying to signal their skills ability in 
research by publishing in English journals ranked mainly in CNRS2 classification decide to collaborate with 
more coauthors of better quality. 
40
Authors who publish in the top tier journals may also have difficulties to find efficient co-authors; this 
argument is consistent with the conclusions of the theoretical model. 
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index, tends to reduce the number and the quality of co-authors. Being interested by a wide variety of 
topics allows an easier finding of coauthors. 
The hh and the gg indexes measure simultaneously the number and the productivity of a 
researcher's coauthors. We turn now to a strict quantitative measure, namely the total number of co-
authors. In column 5 of table 7, the number of co-authors is explained by the h index whereas in 
column 6 it is explained by the g index. The Wald tests again reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity 
of the h and g indexes. Results are relatively similar to those obtained with the quality measure of co-
authorship except for the individual research productivity variable.  
As regards the number of co-authors, there is no difference between male and female 
academics. Again, there is a significant age effect: younger economists tend to collaborate with more 
co-authors. The number of co-authors is also marked by significant cohort effects as all cohort 
dummies are significant. The IRR estimates are increasing over time: younger cohorts are 
collaborating with more co-authors. Finally, the most striking result is that the h or g indexes estimates 
are no more significant (see table 7 columns 5 and 6). Thus individual research productivity is mainly 
a determinant of the quality of co-authors and has no effect on the quantity measure. 
 
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
We run a sensitivity analysis by relying on EconLit publication scores as a measure of the 
individual research productivity, namely the CL and LLG indexes. So we test for the robustness of our 
results to different measures of individual research productivity. Our comments emphasize mainly the 
impact of these indexes on the quality and the number of co-authors. Again we use the best alone 
publication as the instrumental variable. The first stage estimates are reported in table 6 (columns 3 
and 4) and the 2SRI results are reported in table 8. In the first stage estimation, we have applied a 
Heckman selection model as the individual research productivity measures are no more count data. In 
both cases, the Wald test of the null of independent equations is rejected at least at the 5 % level: this 
clearly supports the Heckman selection equation in our data. Results are very similar with these two 
different measures of productivity. Most importantly, our instruments are highly correlated with the 
productivity measures (see table 6)
41
.  
According to the Wald tests, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is always rejected (see table 8). 
Thus individual research productivity measured by the quality of Econlit publications is also 
endogenous to the number and the quality of co-authors. Once this bias corrected by applying the 
2SRI methodology, quality of Econlit publications and citation scores produce similar results as 
regards the determinants of co-authorship. There is a significant gender effect: being a woman reduces 
by about 10% (respectively 3 or 4%) the quality (respectively the number) of co-authors (see table 8). 
The age variable has still a negative and significant effect on both the quality and quantity of co-
authors. Life-time cycles are also significant: again as the cohort dummies estimates are increasing 
over time, younger economists are collaborating with a higher number of better quality co-authors. 
The specialization index and the language of the publications have the same impact as already 
estimated. The most important result is that the CL and LLG indexes have a positive and significant 
                                                          
41
The main differences between individual research productivity measured either by Google scholar citations or 
by publication scores rely on the gender effect and to a lesser extent on the cohort effect. Being a woman reduces 
significantly both the CL and the LLG indexes. Furthermore the dummy cohort variables are less significant with 
the LLG index. Therefore, a cohort effect seems to be at work mainly with citation scores index. 
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effect on the co-authorship variables
42
. Thus the conclusion that more productive academics will 
collaborate with higher quality co-authors is a robust one. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper studies the matching process between researchers writing collective papers. It 
focuses on the links between researchers’ productivities in a team of co-authors and shows that authors 
tend to work with colleagues endowed with similar abilities.  
In a first step, our theoretical model states that if collaboration allows increasing the quantity 
and the quality of the academic production, efficient researchers should have more co-authors than less 
productive ones and these coauthors should be themselves of higher quality. In a second step, we 
present an empirical check of this theoretical prediction by estimating the relationship between the 
researchers’ h index (respectively g-index) and a meta-index synthesizing the number and the 
efficiency of his/her co-authors. Our main finding is that there is a positive relationship between the h 
(resp. g) index of a researcher and our hh (resp. gg) Meta index. This result sheds a new light on 
collaboration in academic activities. While co-writing is generally seen as the way for low skilled 
researchers to increase the quality and the quantity of their research output, our paper shows on the 
opposite that the quality of his/her co-authors constitutes a signaling device for the quality of a 
researcher. 
Others factors appear determinant in the decision of co-authoring a paper. There is a 
significant gender effect: being a woman has no impact on the probability of never collaborating with 
other economists but it decreases both the quality and the quantity of co-authors. As expected the 
academic position of an individual has strong impact on the expected quality of co-authors: Full 
professors tend to collaborate more with higher productive co-authors. Life-time cycles are also an 
important determinant of the co-authorship issue. We have demonstrated that younger cohorts of 
French academics are collaborating with more co-authors who are also more productive. This result 
has a very important economic policy implication. National public agencies should apply different 
evaluation criteria according to the time cohort of the academic. Finally, it is worth noting that 
publishing with his/her PhD supervisor contributes to increase the quality of future co-authors and 
therefore may be seen as a signal of quality in French academia. 
In order to be fully conclusive, additional variables should be considered to analyze a wider 
dimension of the publication activity. For instance, the size of the institution hiring the researcher, the 
influence of the academic networ  or of the research topics on the academic fellows’ resume should be 
also considered to evaluate the robustness of our results. This is let for future research. 
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 For example, if the CL index increases by 1% then the quality of co-authors (the hh index) will be increased 
by 0.16% and the number of co-authors by 0.25%. 
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Annex : Empirical results 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
          Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min       Max 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
                hh |      1566    3.210728    3.428919          0        29 
                gg |      1566     7.43742    8.611137          0        83 
       nb_coauthors|      1566    4.510217    7.447595          0        60 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
                 h |      1566    3.251596    3.991914          0        39 
                 g |      1566     6.02235    8.130808          0        84 
          CL_index |      1566    33.77775    96.90919          0   481.349 
          LLG_inde |      1566    13.72596    29.03717          0   76.6924 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
               age |      1566    46.69796    10.20819         28        68 
   Prof_experience |      1566    21.92593    9.360218          7        46 
      cohorte64_68 |      1566    .0127714    .1123225          0         1 
      cohorte69_73 |      1566    .0606641    .2387894          0         1 
      cohorte74_78 |      1566    .1264368    .3324471          0         1 
      cohorte79_83 |      1566    .1392082    .3462742          0         1 
      cohorte84_88 |      1566    .1085568    .3111818          0         1 
      cohorte89_93 |      1566    .1890166    .3916469          0         1 
      cohorte94_98 |      1566    .2273308    .4192419          0         1 
      cohorte99_04 |      1566    .1360153    .3429143          0         1 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
            Female |      1566    .2828863    .4505455          0         1 
              Male |      1566    .7171137    .4505455          0         1 
------------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        Full Prof. |      1566    .3473819    .4762904          0         1 
         Ass. Prof. |      1566    .6526181    .4762904          0        1 
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-------------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
   never_published |      1566    .2247765    .4175684          0         1 
         cowrite_dr |      1566    .1487867    .3559918          0        1 
         nb_papers |      1566    8.360792    14.17236          0       157 
  nb_papers_Review |      1566    6.182631    9.071662          0        94 
   nb_papers_other |      1566    2.178161    6.367514          0        91 
  never_published_Rev|      1566    .0197957     .139342          0         1 
   nb_papers_Rev_cnrs|      1566    5.376756    8.205418          0        85 
    share_Rev_cnrs |      1183    .8520602    .2479001          0         2 
       share_cnrs1 |      1133    .0679517    .1574878          0         1 
      share _cnrs2 |      1133    .1335283    .1982947          0         1 
      share _cnrs3 |      1133    .4583329    .3324206          0         1 
      share _cnrs4 |      1133    .3349856    .3631996          0         1 
      share _cnrs5 |      1133    .0052015    .0360094          0        .6 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
   share_papers_fr |      1183     .625243    .3329255          0         1 
   share_papers_gb |      1183    .3474892    .3250533          0         1 
share_papers_other |      1183    .0272677    .1147627          0         1 
working_alone_only |      1566    .1232439     .328822          0         1 
  never_working_alone|      1566    .1736909    .3789645          0         1 
Herfindahl_JEL_code|      1566    .3073441    .2636275          0         1 
      -------------+------------------------------------------------------- 
           max_kwa |      1566           0           0          0         0 
           max_kwb |      1566    .0102171    .1005942          0         1 
           max_kwc |      1566    .0006386    .0252699          0         1 
           max_kwd |      1566    .0070243    .0835427          0         1 
           max_kwe |      1566    .0102171    .1005942          0         1 
           max_kwf |      1566    .0102171    .1005942          0         1 
           max_kwg |      1566    .0019157    .0437408          0         1 
           max_kwh |      1566    .0025543    .0504914          0         1 
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           max_kwi |      1566    .0025543    .0504914          0         1 
           max_kwj |      1566    .0038314    .0617995          0         1 
           max_kwk |      1566           0           0          0         0 
           max_kwl |      1566    .0031928     .056433          0         1 
           max_kwm |      1566    .0012771    .0357257          0         1 
           max_kwn |      1566           0           0          0         0 
           max_kwo |      1566    .0057471    .0756158          0         1 
           max_kwp |      1566    .0031928     .056433          0         1 
           max_kwq |      1566    .0025543    .0504914          0         1 
           max_kwr |      1566    .0051086    .0713141          0         1 
           max_kwt |      1566           0           0          0         0 
           max_kwy |      1566           0           0          0         0 
           max_kwz |      1566      .00447    .0667297          0         1 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
     best_alone_C1 |      1566     .059387     .236423          0         1 
     best_alone_C2 |      1566    .0951469    .2935114          0         1 
     best_alone_C3 |      1566    .2662835    .4421555          0         1 
     best_alone_C4 |      1566    .1091954    .3119838          0         1 
     best_alone_C5 |      1566    .0006386    .0252699          0         1 
  best_alone_Econlit |      1566    .0440613    .2052969          0         1 
   best_alone_misc |      1566    .0268199    .1616085          0         1 
 
Table 2: Correlations between individual research productivity indicators 
             |     h             g            CL_index            LLG_index 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
           h |   1.0000  
           g |   0.9503*         1.0000  
    CL_index |   0.6636*         0.6372*          1.0000 
   LLG_index |   0.7302*         0.6838*           0.8970*           1.0000 
* All correlations are significant at the 5% level. N=1566 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by gender 
gender                   variable |      mean        sd       min       max 
--------------------               ---------------------------------------- 
Female                          hh|  2.505643   2.50553         0        12 
                               gg |  5.744921  6.020361         0        35 
                                h |  2.311512  2.686067         0        22 
                                g |  4.383747  5.462493         0        46 
                        LLG_index |  10.76408  16.95661         0  135.3494 
                         CL_index |  14.62185  24.15478         0  175.3353 
                       Ass. PROF. |  .8284424  .3774217         0         1 
                       Full PROF. |  .1715576  .3774217         0         1 
                        nb_papers |  5.187359  7.561131         0        72 
                     nb_coauthors |  3.255079  4.722665         0        37 
                   nb_papers_Rev_cnrs |  3.498871  5.056412         0        52 
                              age |  42.15576  8.976371        29        66 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Male                            hh|  3.488869   3.69499         0        29 
                               gg |  8.105076  9.358078         0        83 
                                h |   3.62244   4.34722         0        39 
                                g |  6.668744   8.88703         0        84 
                        LLG_index |  21.60745  40.15033         0  419.7203 
                         CL_index |  41.33436  112.5501         0  1481.349 
                       Ass. PROF. |  .5832591  .4932388         0         1 
                       Full PROF. |  .4167409  .4932388         0         1 
                        nb_papers |  9.612645  15.87744         0       157 
                     nb_coauthors |  5.005343   8.22879         0        60 
                   nb_papers_Rev_cnrs |  6.117542  9.049797         0        85 
                              age |  48.48976  10.11188        28        68 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Individual Productivity in Research and Co-authorship in economics  Page 36 
 
Total                           hh|  3.210728  3.428919         0        29 
                               gg |   7.43742  8.611137         0        83 
                                h |  3.251596  3.991914         0        39 
                                g |   6.02235  8.130808         0        84 
                         LLG_index|  18.54001   35.5078         0  419.7203 
                         CL_index |  33.77775  96.90919         0  1481.349 
                        Ass. PROF.|  .6526181  .4762904         0         1 
                       Full. PROF.|  .3473819  .4762904         0         1 
                         nb_papers|  8.360792  14.17236         0       157 
                      nb_coauthors|  4.510217  7.447595         0        60 
                    nb_papers_Rev_cnrs|  5.376756  8.205418         0        85 
                              age |  46.69796  10.20819        28        68 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by academic position 
academic_position        variable |      mean        sd       min       max 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ASS. PROF                       hh|  2.246575   2.34403         0        19 
                               gg |  5.039139  5.545329         0        46 
                                h |  2.016634   2.28411         0        25 
                                g |  3.681018  4.688119         0        45 
                        LLG_index |  9.572453  16.04467         0   159.139 
                         CL_index |  11.69965  23.10019         0  244.0104 
                        nb_papers |  4.466732  7.084793         0        87 
                     nb_coauthors |  2.613503  4.187142         0        52 
                   nb_papers_Rev_cnrs |  3.047945  4.380825         0        41 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
FULL PROF                       hh|  5.022059  4.303353         0        29 
                               gg |  11.94301  11.16833         0        83 
                                h |  5.571691  5.277773         0        39 
                                g |  10.42096  10.93212         0        84 
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                        LLG_index |  35.38715  52.09662         0  419.7203 
                         CL_index |  75.25537  153.0455         0  1481.349 
                        nb_papers |  15.67647   20.0588         0       157 
                     nb_coauteurs |  8.073529  10.36365         0        60 
                   nb_papers_Rev_cnrs |  9.751838  11.33936         0        85 
 
 
Table 5: Individual research productivity indicators per year and by cohorts 
cohorte                  variable |      mean        sd       min       max 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cohorte64-68           hh_peryear |  .0923135  .0817156         0  .2608696 
                       gg_peryear |  .2161584  .1898998         0  .6222222 
                        h_peryear |  .1251731  .0997574         0  .3913043 
                        g_peryear |  .2227694   .207504         0  .8260869 
                LLG_index_peryear |  .4454247  .5097879         0  2.037797 
                 CL_index_peryear |  .8343734  1.033474         0  4.509589 
                nb_papers_peryear |  .2942663  .3880721         0  1.673913 
             nb_coauthors_peryear |  .1229395  .2368148         0  .9130435 
                         share_gb |  .1710219  .1875821         0  .5555556 
                         share_fr |  .7564798  .1953899  .3333333         1 
                  never_published |        .2  .4103913         0         1 
                           female |        .1  .3077935         0         1 
----------------------------------+---------------------------------------- 
cohorte69-73           hh_peryear |  .0929661  .1111759         0  .5641026 
                        gg_peryear|  .2210608  .2746659         0  1.589744 
                         h_peryear|  .1056686  .1228009         0  .7435898 
                        g_peryear |   .196483  .2491615         0  1.641026 
                LLG_index_peryear |  .4949158  .8717781         0  6.357573 
                 CL_index_peryear |  1.135906  2.575137         0  19.68135 
                nb_papers_peryear |  .2589028   .399317         0  2.051282 
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             nb_coauthors_peryear |  .1008967  .1949082         0  1.131579 
                         share_gb |  .2084839  .2715722         0         1 
                         share_fr |  .7277525  .3117807         0         1 
                  never_published |  .2631579  .4426835         0         1 
                           female |  .1052632  .3085203         0         1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cohorte74-78           hh_peryear |  .0809532  .1051675         0    .71875 
                       gg_peryear |  .2075475  .3257318         0  2.441176 
                        h_peryear |  .0951696  .1210431         0  .7142857 
                        g_peryear |  .1746357  .2553125         0   1.84375 
                LLG_index_peryear |  .4144785  .8375098         0  5.029756 
                 CL_index_peryear |  .9674282  2.448345         0   18.8523 
                nb_papers_peryear |  .2262017   .444681         0  2.485714 
             nb_coauthors_peryear |  .0984183  .1981759         0   1.21875 
                         share_gb |  .2348792  .2979328         0         1 
                         share_fr |  .7313249  .3142713         0         1 
                  never_published |  .2676768  .4438704         0         1 
                           female |  .1111111  .3150663         0         1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cohorte79-83           hh_peryear |  .0871213  .1201428         0  .6666667 
                        gg_peryear|  .2099158  .2938712         0  1.666667 
                         h_peryear|  .0912466  .1464147         0  .7407407 
                        g_peryear |   .174917  .2953089         0  1.740741 
                LLG_index_peryear |   .434929  .9996627         0  8.562396 
                 CL_index_peryear |  .8879347  2.604961         0  22.54853 
                nb_papers_peryear |  .2075978  .4104167         0  2.964286 
             nb_coauthors_peryear |  .1142663  .2397139         0  1.555556 
                         share_gb |  .2380916  .2938016         0         1 
                         share_fr |  .7153819    .32319         0         1 
                  never_published |  .3899083  .4888517         0         1 
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                           female |  .2155963  .4121819         0         1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cohorte84-88           hh_peryear |   .161737  .2078012         0  1.208333 
                        gg_peryear|  .3747277  .4848179         0  2.772727 
                        h_peryear |   .157683  .2389585         0     1.625 
                         g_peryear|  .2884432  .4640665         0       3.5 
                 LLG_index_peryear|  1.020523  2.418725         0  18.24871 
                 CL_index_peryear |  2.574519  8.349001         0  61.72287 
                nb_papers_peryear |  .4309983   .882481         0  6.304348 
             nb_coauthors_peryear |  .2328522  .4375852         0       2.5 
                         share_gb |  .3418605  .3280554         0         1 
                         share_fr |  .6336796  .3337274         0         1 
                  never_published |  .2882353  .4542793         0         1 
                           female |  .2058824  .4055394         0         1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cohorte89-93           hh_peryear |  .1753634  .1747176         0  .9473684 
                        gg_peryear|  .3967337    .42326         0  2.190476 
                        h_peryear |   .182196  .2249889         0       1.5 
                        g_peryear |  .3379134  .4548101         0  3.555556 
                LLG_index_peryear |  1.202878  2.344683         0  20.15555 
                 CL_index_peryear |  2.094658   5.73278         0  69.01778 
                nb_papers_peryear |  .5226029  .8686731         0  8.263158 
             nb_coauthors_peryear |  .2969896  .4593647         0  2.894737 
                          share_gb|  .3594232    .31641         0         1 
                         share_fr |     .6215  .3266946         0         1 
                  never_published |  .2297297  .4213714         0         1 
                           female |   .347973   .477134         0         1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cohorte94-98           hh_peryear |  .2321876  .1929647         0  1.307692 
                       gg_peryear |  .5267201  .4591398         0  2.923077 
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                        h_peryear |  .2192839  .1945358         0    1.3125 
                        g_peryear |  .4058047  .4235059         0  3.066667 
                LLG_index_peryear |  1.320411  1.960414         0  18.70189 
                 CL_index_peryear |  1.872301  3.235122         0  34.11071 
                nb_papers_peryear |  .5752364  .7581522         0  5.538462 
             nb_coauthors_peryear |  .3379599  .4525615         0  3.466667 
                         share_gb |  .4117107   .329633         0         1 
                         share_fr |  .5704174  .3349058         0         1 
                  never_published |  .1404494  .3479417         0         1 
                           female |  .3960674  .4897671         0         1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cohorte99-04           hh_peryear |   .358184  .2572319         0       1.6 
                        gg_peryear|  .7796462  .6420484         0       3.9 
                         h_peryear|  .3126832  .2864607         0       2.1 
                         g_peryear|  .5729656   .605065         0         5 
                LLG_index_peryear |  1.905336  2.112206         0  12.06301 
                 CL_index_peryear |  2.099203  2.878418         0  18.47889 
                nb_papers_peryear |  .7562915  .8380927         0       6.4 
             nb_coauthors_peryear |  .4621283  .5000604         0       2.9 
                          share_gb|  .4511526  .3277379         0         1 
                          share_fr|  .5293931  .3284885         0         1 
                  never_published |   .084507   .278802         0         1 
                           female |  .3896714  .4888245         0         1 
----------------------------------+---------------------------------------- 
Total                   hh_peryear|  .1813883  .2000601         0       1.6 
                        gg_peryear|  .4130868   .477887         0       3.9 
                         h_peryear|  .1766795  .2154634         0       2.1 
                         g_peryear|  .3265625  .4407232         0         5 
                LLG_index_peryear |  1.046137  1.915127         0  20.15555 
                 CL_index_peryear |  1.712053  4.433391         0  69.01778 
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                 nb_papers_peryear|  .4561684   .738855         0  8.263158 
              nb_coauthors_peryear|  .2571403  .4146959         0  3.466667 
                          share_gb|  .3474892  .3250533         0         1 
                         share_fr |   .625243  .3329255         0         1 
                  never_published |  .2247765  .4175684         0         1 
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Table 6: First-Stage Estimations: Results for the individual research productivity variables 
 
 
Individual Productivity in Research and Co-authorship in economics  Page 43 
 
 
The IRR value is the Incidence Rate Ratio of variable I and it is calculated as    ; so if regressor i is increased by 1% the dependant variable will be increased by (1-IRR) 
%.P-values are reported in the P>|z| column (robust standard errors are calculated by bootstrap). The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level (***), 5 % (**) and 10% 
(*).lnalpha indicates the overdispersion parameter of the negative binomial distribution. The offset variable is the professional experience variable in each model. In the 
Heckman selection model, the athrho variable is the estimate of the inverse hyperbolic tangent of rho ( ) -
residuals of the two equations. The Wald test of independent equations is the likelihood-ratio test  = 0 and it is computationally the comparison of the joint likelihood 
of an independent probit model for the selection equation and a regression model on research productivity index data against the Heckman model likelihood. 
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Table 7: Determinants of co-authorship: 2SRI Estimation Results  
 
Dependant variable:
Model
IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z|
H 1.039757*** 0.000 1.042237*** 0.000 1.004025 0.688
G 1.020522*** 0.000 1.021633*** 0.000 .9983641 0,727
Standardized-Residual 1.126451*** 0.000 1.109018*** 0.000 1.133134*** 0.000 1.102424*** 0.000 1.167272*** 0.000 1.1922*** 0.000
Age .9852736*** 0.000 .9854045*** 0.000 .9906243** 0.023 .9888942*** 0.007 .975415*** 0.000 .9729548*** 0.000
Female .9241381** 0.038 .9306992* 0.059 .9840804 0.694 .985529 0.724 .9218153* 0.099 .9233338 0.113
Cowrite_dr  1.261285*** 0.000  1.26846*** 0.000 1.238887*** 0.000 1.255716*** 0.000 1.270383*** 0.000 1.328744*** 0.000
PR_CE 1.319049*** 0.001  1.204146** 0.049 1.426929*** 0.000 1.271924*** 0.010 1.4579*** 0.001 1.568339*** 0.000
PR_2C 1.123684*** 0.001 1.132486*** 0.005 1.124639** 0.017 1.129122** 0.014 1.195797*** 0.002 1.205116*** 0.002
PR_1C 1.201338*** 0.005 1.140478** 0.031 1.17343*** 0.010 1.126719* 0.052 1.333257*** 0.000 1.330581*** 0.000
MCF_HC  .8917328 0.197  .8833541   0.188 .890631 0.155 .8942705 0.172 .9197727 0.454 .8825842 0.262
Working_alone_only  .531641*** 0.000  .5334222*** 0.000
cohort64-68 .3690495*** 0.000 .4155215*** 0.000 .3122876*** 0.000 .3633593*** 0.000 .3394253*** 0.000 .4128732*** 0.001
cohort69-73 .4246863 0.000 .4468632*** 0.000 .3755773*** 0.000 .4010743*** 0.000 .3581325*** 0.000 .3702197*** 0.000
cohort74-78 .3903951*** 0.000 .4242865*** 0.000 .4108896*** 0.000 .4422769*** 0.000 .3807995*** 0.000 .3983065*** 0.000
cohort79-83 .4608758*** 0.000 .475241*** 0.000 .44187*** 0.000 .4694847*** 0.000 .5035105*** 0.000 .5392617*** 0.000
cohort84-88 .5589912*** 0.000 .5661185*** 0.000 .5598416*** 0.000 .5795794*** 0.000 .6137121*** 0.000 .6607299*** 0.000
cohort89-93 .5962211*** 0.000 .6119466*** 0.000 .605443*** 0.000 .6270194*** 0.000 .7133021*** 0.000 .7490796*** 0.001
cohort94-98 .7079183*** 0.000  .7329668*** 0.000 .7258089*** 0.000 .7541094*** 0.000 .7670176*** 0.000 .7864654*** 0.000
nb_papers_Misc 1.006274*** 0.003 1.005524*** 0.006 1.00685** 0.023 1.007065** 0.019 1.016252*** 0.000 1.021924*** 0.000
nb_papers_EconLit_no_CNRS 1.004665 0.527 1.001992 0.774 1.009589 0.290 1.00799 0.370 1.03505*** 0.001 1.03261*** 0.000
nb_papers_CNRS1 .9893791** 0.027 .9897854** 0.040 .987247* 0.052 .9847426** 0.018 1.011172 0.118 1.005861 0.440
nb_papers_CNRS2 1.01123 0.217 1.010868 0.264 1.023509** 0.012 1.028064*** 0.003 1.01944 0.079 1.024409** 0.034
nb_papers_CNRS3 1.006837 0.136  1.006638 0.146 1.013484*** 0.006 1.013384*** 0.007 1.05563*** 0.000 1.060079*** 0.000
nb_papers_CNRS4 1.00393 0.507 1.006825 0.214 1.002371 0.678 1.00501 0.395 1.053119*** 0.000 1.050871*** 0.000
nb_papers_CNRS5 .9734185 0.607 .9681081 0.565 1.022522 0.718 1.0128 0.836 .9457282 0.459 1.007413 0.924
Herfindahl_JEL_CODE .8011764*** 0.009 .8183969** 0.018 .7890423*** 0.005 .7870318*** 0.005 .4493046*** 0.000 .4381293*** 0.000
Share_gb 1.308479*** 0.000 1.323982*** 0.000 1.531048*** 0.000 1.489122*** 0.000 1.747907*** 0.000 1.881927*** 0.000
Share_other 1.09702 0.550  1.106846 0.509 1.108722 0.534 1.072947 0.673 .8145187 0.412 .8954796 0.663
PhD defended at   (Network effect I) :
Univ. of Toulouse 1 1.067021 0.413 1.090307 0.319 1.008725 0.917 1.008725 0.917 1.231663* 0.067 1.212608* 0.062
Other French research institution  .9622981 0.345  1.024923 0.610 .9336406 0.107 .9336406 0.107 .9717338 0.645 .9738609 0.621
Univ. of Paris 10  .9767195 0.670  .978346 0.712 .9826961 0.798 .9826961 0.798 .8433606* 0.064 .8400375** 0.049
Univ. of Aix-Marseille  1.072036 0.222  1.057769 0.464 1.089994 0.203 1.089994 0.203 .891283 0.260 .8785316 0.143
Univ. of Strasbourg 1.105696 0.227 1.125961 0.283 1.076385 0.417 1.076385 0.417 .7756882 0.141 .876032 0.255
Univ. of Paris 9 .7674918** 0.023 .7374286*** 0.007 .8468169* 0.095 .8468169* 0.095 .9912081 0.943 1.01117 0.928
Grande Ecole  1.182339** 0.014 1.155048* 0.056 1.309115*** 0.001 1.309115*** 0.001 1.003747 0.971 1.064606 0.536
Other Univ.  In Paris 1.098862* 0.091 1.052457 0.359 1.108811 0.136 1.108811 0.136 .9464552 0.535 1.008636 0.924
European country 1.395722*** 0.007 1.439115*** 0.002 1.560409*** 0.002 1.560409 0.002 1.38816* 0.060 1.268299 0.191
US .890038 0.523 1.002826 0.985 .9419018 0.760 .9419018 0.760 1.52725* 0.056 1.47037* 0.099
Universities  (Network effect II) NO Yes NO Yes NOYes
ZIP ZIP ZINB ZINB
(5) (6)(4)
HH GG NB_COAUTHORS
ZINB ZINB
(1) (2) (3)
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The IRR value is the Incidence Rate Ratio of variable i ant it is calculated as    ; so if regressor i is increased by 1% the dependant variable will be increased by (1-IRR) %. 
P-values are reported in the P>|z| column (robust standard errors are calculated by bootstrap). The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level (***), 5 % (**) and 10% 
(*).lnalpha indicates the overdispersion parameter of the negative binomial distribution. The null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected at the 1% level (µµµ), 5% level (µµ) and 
10% level(µ). All parent models include a constant parameter which is not reported in the table. The offset variable is the Experience variable. 
 
 
 
                                Inflate : logit model
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z|
H -3.414301*** 0.001 -3.37412*** 0.010 -7.548156*** 0.000
G -.7498065*** 0.000 -.7498065*** 0.000 -5.219176*** 0.000
Standardized-Residual 1.736803* 0.107  1.605957 0.186 1.465291** 0.011 1.465291** 0.011 14.75788*** 0.000 22.05012*** 0.000
Age -.0435219 0.454 -.0350149 0.544 .0178888 0.527 .0178888 0.527 -.1305535* 0.063 -.5140615*** 0.003
Female -.1805496 0.753  -.1502756 0.808 .0666068 0.818 .0666068 0.819 -38.75202 0.952 -37.45614 0.936
PR_CE .9114115 0.784 .913769 0.805 -.4992077 0.642 -.4992077 0.642 1.603895 0.168 1.160897 0.383
PR_2C  -.4850895 0.506 -.5655367 0.484 .2461645 0.516 .2461645 0.516 .6723288 0.380 .5102187 0.627
PR_1C  -.4845668 0.544  -.5105686 0.553 -.6838853* 0.101 -.6838853* 0.101 1.402785** 0.047 1.875419* 0.088
MCF_HC  -1.272412 0.284 -1.119334 0.326 .3343665 0.421 -.3343665 0.421 .3779083 0.566 -.0398384 0.967
cohort64-68 6.98064** 0.023  6.837184** 0.035 2.612548 0.167 2.612548 0.167 32.54643*** 0.000 75.41312 0.973
cohort69-73  4.503021** 0.024 4.380308** 0.033 1.906422* 0.057 1.906422* 0.057 19.76823*** 0.001 63.7169 0.978
cohort74-78 2.326547* 0.099 2.382214 0.125 1.48731** 0.050 1.48731** 0.050 15.54651*** 0.002 57.10527 0.980
cohort79-83 1.490585 0.258 1.364695 0.322 .5237884 0.472 .5237884 0.472 14.23103*** 0.002 55.29417 0.981
cohort84-88 1.874462 0.184 1.70459 0.301 .7831614 0.230 .7831614 0.230 15.30598*** 0.001 54.52447 0.981
cohort89-93 1.40844 0.178 1.415473 0.229 .4452705 0.436 .4452705 0.436 12.68754*** 0.003 45.61329 0.984
cohort94-98 .6074362 0.475 .6644003 0.519 .2522305 0.607 .2522305 0.607 9.68772*** 0.004 19.89594 0.993
constant 2.420922 0.390 1.853168 0.525 -.6780755 0.631 -.6780755 0.631 4.485352 0.215 -10.7505 0.993
lnalpha -1.952367*** 0.000 -1.952367*** 0.000 -1.901721*** 0.000 -1.568005*** 0.000
N
Log Likelihood
Vuong Test (unconstraint) 4.73*** 0.000 4.38*** 0.000 8.28*** 0.000 8.10*** 0.000 6.56*** 0.000 6.55*** 0.000
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0 575.91 *** 0.000 352.01*** 0.000 370.94*** 0.000 553.21*** 0.000
Exogeneity test (Wald test) 32.94
µµµ
0.000 20.93
µµµ
0.000 29.61
µµµ
0.000 15.94
µµµ
0.000 42.85
µµµ
0.000 45.05
µµµ
0.000
1183
-2601.264
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
11831183 1183
-2262.49 -2213.927 -3272.022 -3836.815 -2680.350
(6)
1183 1183
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Table 8: Robustness checks: Determinants of co-authorship 
 
Dependant variable:
Model
IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z| IRR P>|z|
CL-index 1.0016*** 0.000 1.001304*** 0.000 1.002478*** 0.000
LLG-index 1.005915*** 0.000 1.004632*** 0.000 1.005347*** 0.000
Standardized-Residual 1.003008 0.691 1.007984** 0.022 1.015563** 0.038 1.011484*** 0.002 1.057704*** 0.000 1.03337*** 0.000
Age .9772159 0.000 .9792032*** 0.000 .991479* 0.078 .9928148 0.123 .9592894*** 0.000 .9705186*** 0.000
Female .9013064** 0.036 .9091849** 0.044 .9703375 0.542 .9898528 0.827 .779914*** 0.000 .8767449*** 0.019
Cowrite_dr 1.366051 0.000 1.37816*** 0.000 1.275365*** 0.000 1.274232*** 0.000 1.357346*** 0.000 1.32112*** 0.000
PR_CE 2.389134*** 0.000 1.928204*** 0.000 1.874848*** 0.000 1.621036*** 0.000 2.652294*** 0.000 1.990655*** 0.000
PR_2C 1.352706*** 0.000 1.301035*** 0.000 1.23523*** 0.000 1.196042*** 0.001 1.443428*** 0.000 1.257602*** 0.001
PR_1C 1.708428*** 0.000 1.523754*** 0.000 1.427667*** 0.000 1.313868*** 0.000 1.958431*** 0.000 1.58221*** 0.000
MCF_HC .9944974 0.955 .9465338 0.569 .3269134*** 0.000 .8734581 0.147 .9103242 0.472 .9019052 0.400
cohort64-68 .3022697*** 0.000 .328389*** 0.000 .3839133*** 0.000 .3354482*** 0.000 .5507499* 0.059 .5376615** 0.031
cohort69-73 .337953*** 0.000 .3543386*** 0.000 .4138367*** 0.000 .3902346*** 0.000 .4179275*** 0.000 .4084654*** 0.000
cohort74-78 .3453074*** 0.000 .3533337*** 0.000 .4932791*** 0.000 .4081982*** 0.000 .5364283*** 0.001 .4928987*** 0.000
cohort79-83 .4105089*** 0.000 .4148241*** 0.000 .5715696*** 0.000 .4786778*** 0.000 .7452103* 0.088 .6635999*** 0.008
cohort84-88 .5303776*** 0.000 .5384428*** 0.000 .6581819*** 0.000 .5646688*** 0.000 .7358037** 0.038 .7110265** 0.011
cohort89-93 .6078139*** 0.000 .5976638*** 0.000 .7476915**** 0.000 .6373786*** 0.000 .9940561 0.956 .9207603 0.395
cohort94-98 .7065424*** 0.000 .7030873*** 0.000 .8242373*** 0.000 .7241441*** 0.000 .9793003 0.811 .9057413 0.198
PhD defended at   (Network effect I) :
Univ. of Toulouse 1 .8588143 0.119 .8906226 0.218 .8242373* 0.052 .8774745 0.175 .8375818 0.173 .8475816 0.161
Other French research institution .8947545** 0.027 .9215736* 0.095 .8568114*** 0.002 .880456*** 0.009 .886165* 0.064 .9329208 0.248
Univ. of Paris 10 .9984095 0.984 1.000657 0.993 .9067076 0.223 .9152171 0.256 .7922757** 0.030 .78888** 0.017
Univ. of Aix-Marseille .965878 0.666 .9764135 0.761 .9841681 0.844 .9910739 0.909 .8162309* 0.059 .8223728** 0.048
Univ. of Strasbourg 1.281718** 0.015 1.273284** 0.013 1.099083 0.388 1.10262 0.355 1.013742 0.921 .9879296 0.925
Univ. of Paris 9 .7912667** 0.040 .7929879** 0.036 .8063962* 0.063 .8264638* 0.088 .8250456 0.199 .8278389 0.166
Grande Ecole 1.292688*** 0.006 1.318144*** 0.002 1.319735*** 0.000 1.358476*** 0.001 1.106039 0.421 1.041512 0.727
Other Univ.  In Paris 1.091465 0.266 1.100146 0.214 1.056966 0.506 1.069775 0.402 1.034177 0.761 1.010941 0.915
European country 1.889908*** 0.000 1.987807*** 0.000 1.813658*** 0.001 1.876908*** 0.000 1.513432* 0.076 1.584631** 0.027
US 1.083623 0.724 1.224009 0.352 .9617424 0.869 1.048616 0.834 1.22257 0.501 1.355687 0.256
Herfindahl_KW .7764863*** 0.006 .7905826*** 0.010 .6078884*** 0.000 .6587948*** 0.000 .3408761*** 0.000 .3240986*** 0.000
Share_gb 1.903197*** 0.000 1.89281*** 0.000 1.934445*** 0.000
Share_other 1.134149 0.509 1.179378 0.369 .8166748 0.454
HH GG NB_COAUTHORS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ZINB ZINB ZINB ZINB ZINB ZINB
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The IRR value is the Incidence Rate Ratio of variable i ant it is calculated as    ; so if regressor i is increased by 1% the dependant variable will be increased by (1-IRR) %. 
P-values are reported in the P>|z| column (robust standard errors are calculated by bootstrap). The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level (***), 5 % (**) and 10% 
(*).lnalpha indicates the overdispersion parameter of the negative binomial distribution. The null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected at the 1% level (µµµ), 5% level (µµ) and 
10% level(µ). All parent models include a constant parameter which is not reported in the table. The offset variable is the Experience variable. 
 
                                Inflate : logit model
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z|
CL-index -.1713406*** 0.000 -.0353674*** 0.000 -.4324095*** 0.000
LLG-index -.400623*** 0.000 -.0787158*** 0.000 -2.6447*** 0.000
Standardized-Residual .095492* 0.088 .0787085* 0.074 .3386137*** 0.000 .1747955*** 0.000 1.374328*** 0.000 4.515943*** 0.000
Age .0508537*** 0.010 .0537892*** 0.005 .045454* 0.080 .0689766*** 0.006 -.0121094 0.579 .0969078 0.245
Female .3428557 0.140 .3750159* 0.103 .3049845 0.291 .4559854* 0.095 -1.76851*** 0.000 -6.621425*** 0.000
PR_CE -1.04646 0.117 -1.134538 0.133 -1.756188* 0.060 -1.644496** 0.045 -.783238 0.339 -1.219885 0.692
PR_2C -.7530014* 0.073 -.6183909 0.131 .117625 0.756 -.1741986 0.637 -.9368175** 0.025 .2196244 0.869
PR_1C -1.321026*** 0.000 -1.312619*** 0.001 -1.066789** 0.012 -1.141776*** 0.005 -.1840026 0.666 .4426868 0.693
MCF_HC -.2544673 0.389 -.3414806 0.265 -.505504 0.240 -.5819776 0.158 -.0793486 0.818 .2285113 0.843
cohort64-68 3.007732** 0.011 2.885046** 0.018 3.174666** 0.025 2.068796 0.121 11.6493*** 0.000 35.07727*** 0.000
cohort69-73 1.794842** 0.021 1.768232** 0.022 2.707837*** 0.006 1.965276** 0.036 8.646351*** 0.000 29.04559*** 0.000
cohort74-78 1.603819** 0.024 1.508179** 0.029 2.912361*** 0.001 2.025999** 0.011 9.815295*** 0.000 32.86846*** 0.000
cohort79-83 1.430626** 0.031 1.281215** 0.042 2.37005*** 0.004 1.523386** 0.049 10.26298*** 0.000 33.82659*** 0.000
cohort84-88 1.587691*** 0.008 1.468928** 0.011 2.471345*** 0.001 1.676028** 0.021 8.135476*** 0.000 27.14741*** 0.000
cohort89-93 1.173924** 0.029 1.118926** 0.037 1.816784*** 0.009 1.274693* 0.052 8.024847*** 0.000 29.14987*** 0.000
cohort94-98 .5039553 0.337 .407361 0.421 1.213887** 0.043 .5977456 0.301 5.777882*** 0.000 13.93092*** 0.000
constant -3.612173*** 0.000 -3.586909*** 0.000 -4.673654*** 0.000 -5.488118*** 0.000 -.2726039 0.754 -12.0514*** 0.001
lnalpha -1.936493*** 0.000 -2.10015*** 0.000 -1.357579*** 0.000 -1.46246*** 0.000 -.8564862*** 0.000 -1.112601*** 0.000
N
Log Likelihood
Vuong Test 8.14*** 0.000 8.27*** 0.000 6.91*** 0.000 7.08*** 0.000 14.38*** 0.000 10.99*** 0.000
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0
157.60*** 0.000 115.50*** 0.000 1204.56*** 0.000 1070.03*** 0.000 1480.87*** 0.000 1162.63 0.000
Exogeneity test (Wald test) 2.92 0.232 7.58
µµ
0.0226 38.47
µµµ
0.000 29.47
µµµ
0.000 139.44
µµµ
0.000 75.36
µµµ
0.000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1566 1566 1183 1183 1566 1183
-3128.945 -3469.983 -3457.168 -3130.962 -2739.573-3094.878
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